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Abstract
The hostile environment in which Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) operate make
them vulnerable to a plethora of security and privacy issues. VANET technology is
applicable in a variety of domains such as Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) and
often exhibit characteristics similar to Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) such as inad-
equate infrastructure and unreliable connectivity especially at the early stages of de-
ployment. Hence, security and privacy techniques proposed for conventional VANETs
may not scale well in such early deployment scenarios. In this thesis, novel security and
location privacy schemes based on pseudonym communication, mix-zone, group com-
munication, trust and certiﬁcate revocation are explored. First, the location privacy
issue in DTN-based VANETs is analysed. Secondly, the use of an On-the-Fly Mix-zone
Scheme (OFMS) together with a Privacy-preSerVing (PriSerV) scheme where vehicles
can form mix-zones without the need for a Road Side Unit (RSU) is proposed. An
extension to the PriSerV scheme considers full-scale deployment using a distributed
architecture which represents later stages of deployment. Lastly, a Delay Tolerant Re-
vocation Scheme (DTRvS) is proposed. In the scheme, malicious vehicles that drop
packets are excluded from network communication. The opinion of other vehicles is
used to identify misbehaving vehicles. The proposed OFMS shows an 8% increase in
pseudonym change for a vehicle density of 250 vehicles. By varying the vehicle density
from 50 to 250, there is about 6 to 10% increase in the pseudonym change compared
to the basic scheme. When compared to the baseline scheme, the proposed OFMS-x
show a 50% increase in the delivery probability and has a considerable decrease in the
delivery overhead even with the increase in the number of vehicles in the network. In
terms of the achievable location privacy, the proposed scheme performed better than
AVATAR and the traditional mix-zone schemes. The security and eﬃciency analysis of
the proposed DTRvS show that it is more robust compared to the baseline schemes.
The delivery probability improved by 2 to 11% with DTRvS when 0 to 50% malicious
vehicles are in the network. The chances of CRL delivery increases with the increase
in the number of RSUs. Again, there is about 5% improvement when DTRvS is used
compared to the use of native Spray & Wait-based routing scheme.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 VANETs and DTNs - Background
Many years of advances in wireless network technology have ushered in a variety of
application domains of Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs). These applications
have resulted in disruptive changes to the life of its users. Examples of the applica-
tions of VANET technology include Intelligent Transport Systems (ITSs)[5], Connected
Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs)[6], Internet of Things (IoT) and Internet of Vehicles
(IoVs)[7, 8], Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (VDTNs)[9], and Delay/Disruption
Tolerant Networks (henceforth regarded as DTNs in this thesis)[10]. DTN is an ap-
proach to computer network architecture that seeks to address the technical issues in
simply heterogeneous networks that may lack continuous network connectivity. VDTNs
is based on DTNs as a solution to provide eﬃcient vehicular communications in chal-
lenged scenarios where long delays and sporadic connections exist. This implies that
VDTNs lack end-to-end connectivity and utilises a store-carry-and-forward paradigm,
inspirited from DTNs to forwards messages on a hop-by-hop basis towards a destination
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by moving vehicles [9].
Speciﬁc application domains such as ITSs, IoVs, and CAVs have attracted a great deal
of attention in recent years both in the academia and industries. The key feature of
these technologies is that vehicles are ﬁtted with multiple sensors through which various
forms of data including the location information of drivers can be collected, analysed
and exchanged among vehicles for various purposes including road safety, eﬃcient traﬃc
management and driver/user convenience. In the near future, it is expected that millions
of vehicles will be connected through a complex network infrastructure to form IoVs
using various technologies, both in industrial and domestic contexts. VANETs for ITS
are characterised by dynamic mobility patterns, infrequent connectivity, and frequent
topology changes in addition to the somewhat hostile environments in which wireless
networks are deployed.
In addition to security threats speciﬁc to wireless networks, some location privacy
threats to users/drivers exist too due to the location information embedded in ex-
changed messages. For instance, a malicious vehicle can engage in packet dropping
attacks in order to deny other vehicles access to safety-related information in multi-
hop networks. Such malicious vehicles can also lie about their location information
to deceive rescue workers in emergencies in order to evade prosecution in hit-and-run
accidents. In emergency and rescue situations, accurate location information is needed
to eﬃciently direct rescue workers and the police for eﬃcient victim evacuation.
A major threat to location privacy is the possibility of location Privacy Attacker (PA)
revealing the real identity of vehicles and their users using tracking algorithms which
may expose users to social proﬁling. Malicious vehicles can also use location information
to stalk other road users and reveal their Personal Identifying Information(PII) (i.e.
breach of identity privacy). Of course, the close-knit relationship between a driver and
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his vehicle implies that tracking a vehicle is as good as tracking/following its driver's
whereabouts.
Throughout this thesis, disconnected network architectures based on the IEEE 802.11p
framework which represents ITS in the early stages of deployment are considered. The
early stage of ITS deployment is similar to DTNs and VDTNs that lack end-to-end
connectivity.
1.2 Research Motivation
Although a plethora of eﬀorts and proposals have been put forward in recent years
to address the privacy challenges, there is no holy grail or one-size-ﬁts-all approach to
addressing them. Therefore, this thesis focuses on security and location privacy issues
in the application domain of VANETs for ITSs at the early stages of deployment.
Most existing security and location privacy schemes for VANETs and ITS assume the
existence of end-to-end connectivity between the diﬀerent network components namely
vehicles, RSUs and the Certiﬁcate Authority (CA) otherwise known as the Trusted Key
Manager (TKM). These assumptions may not always hold. The disconnected nature
and high dynamics in the mobility of vehicles in VANETs especially at their early stages
of deployment creates a new set of challenges. Hence, the security and location privacy
techniques applicable in conventional VANETs fail to be adequate and eﬀective. In the
early stages of deployment of VANETs, they are usually characterised by low infrastruc-
ture and thus exhibit the attributes of DTNs and VDTNs with infrequent connections
and delays. Examples of early stage deployment can be partical deployment in city,
rural areas, battleﬁeld and military communication scenarios. In this thesis, VANETs,
ITS, and intermittently connected VANETs (IC-VANETs) is used interchangeably to
mean the same.
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Although there have been a myriad of research eﬀorts in the last couple of years, there
is yet to be an agreed upon standard and consensus approach to addressing a variety
of security and location privacy issues. In addition, some of the proposed schemes are
hardly well detailed for an informed opinion to guide policy makers and stakeholders
in terms of their implementation. At other times, especially at the early stages of
deployment, the schemes mentioned above may fail to cope well in providing security
and location privacy.
Some of the key areas related to security and location privacy are discussed in this thesis
including pseudonymised communication, mix-zones, group communication, trust-based
communication and certiﬁcate revocation. In pseudonymised communication, alterna-
tive identiﬁers known as pseudonyms are issued to vehicles by the CA together with a
public key certiﬁcate with which they can sign messages. That way, it is not easy for a
malicious vehicle to track and identify a vehicle and its driver using its real identity. In
order to reduce the tracking probability, it is recommended that vehicles change their
pseudonyms simultaneously at regular intervals at mix-zones. The tracking probability
is a term used to describe the chances of an attacker successfully identifying a target
vehicle by its real identity even after pseudonym change. That way, it is more diﬃcult
for a PA to easily identify a target vehicle. Mix-zones are places such as traﬃc junctions,
road intersections, and parking malls where multiple vehicles can synchronously change
pseudonyms at the same time and location in order to reduce the chances of being
tracked by a PA. It then follows that location privacy depends on vehicular density, as
well as the number of vehicles willing to contribute to pseudonym change in mix-zone
based privacy schemes. Generally, pseudonym-based schemes such as mix-zones assume
the existence of enough vehicle density to change pseudonyms. Motivated by the above
observations, this thesis aims to address the issues relating to security and location
privacy outlined below.
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1.3 Research Objectives
Although this thesis speciﬁcally addressed disconnected networks, the proposed schemes
can be extended to suit full deployment scenarios (an example is discussed in Chapter
5).
Research Question 1:
The ﬁrst question the thesis attempts to address is the location privacy problem in
disconnected VANETs. This is achieved by analysing existing schemes which include
Silent Period, CacheCloak, mix-zones and group communication approaches. In order
to understand the location privacy problem in disconnected VANETs and propose new
solutions, a critical review of existing literature for the purpose of identifying research
gaps as brieﬂy summarised in Section 1.2 was carried out. From the existing literature,
there is no existing scheme analysing the privacy problem in relation to the attacker
behaviour that is speciﬁc to disconnected VANETs.
A major challenge is that the disconnected nature of the network makes it diﬃcult to
understand the location privacy dynamics and the attacker's behaviour with regards
to the vehicle mobility. The irregular mobility pattern makes it even more challenging
than it is in other types of VANETs. The objective is to address this research gap and
propose a novel solution that is eﬃcient in providing location privacy against a strong
privacy attacker. Although some research work has looked into methods to achieve
location privacy in VANETs such as the AMOEBA protocol [11], this thesis is the
ﬁrst that considers the characterisation of the location privacy problem speciﬁcally for
disconnected VANETs using simulations. The AMOEBA protocol, on the other hand,
considered group communication and not just location privacy analysis. In addition
to the characterisation, the thesis sought to propose a location privacy scheme based
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on group communication which takes advantage of vehicle density to address a novel
location privacy scheme for VANETs.
Research Question 2:
Mix-zones are ﬁxed in time and location which implies that vehicles have no ﬂexibility in
terms of the time and location they choose to change pseudonyms. The predictability
of the mix-zones also makes it possible for the attacker to easily guess the time and
location of the pseudonym change. Again, the dependence of the pseudonym scheme
on vehicle density even becomes an issue in sparse network scenarios especially if selﬁsh
vehicles refuse to cooperate to change pseudonyms. In line with this objective, the thesis
addresses the possibility of using dynamic mix-zones where vehicles can form on-the-ﬂy
mix-zones instead of changing pseudonyms at administrator-deﬁned mix-zones. This
allows vehicles to change pseudonyms at locations and times of their choice depending
on their privacy needs.
Research Question 3:
The third research question concerns the eﬀective revocation of misbehaving vehicles
in disconnected VANETs without degradation in network functionality. In VANETs,
malicious vehicles can drop packets due to selﬁsh reasons in order to conserve resources
such as energy and bandwidth/communication cost. An example of communication is
the burden pseudonym signal messages. This is particularly obtainable in a multi-hop
forwarding network where such intermediate malicious vehicles are unwilling to forward
packets. Packet dropping can aﬀect the quality of information available to other vehicles
for making road manoeuvres and driving decisions. This means that the quality of the
messages exchanged in VANETs is key to the usefulness of the system. Additionally,
packet dropping can degrade the routing eﬃciency of the system. In extreme cases
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of misbehaviour, it is important to stop such vehicles from further participation in
network communication. One way of achieving this is through revocation. However,
it is important to establish mechanisms for identifying such vehicles before blacklisting
them. The thesis' objective here is to investigate the reliability of trust schemes where
vehicles cannot always be expected to follow normal protocols. Revocation or suspension
of misbehaving vehicles is essential to avoid degradation in network service and possible
economic damage.
Research Question 4:
VANETs are vulnerable to a range of threats that are magniﬁed due to the open and
hostile environments in which they operate. Examples of popular attacks prevalent
in VANETs include manipulation and dropping of location information as described
earlier. An example attack is a position spooﬁng attack where a vehicle receives location
information and instead of forwarding the information, either drop it or alters its content
in order to mislead other vehicles. This thesis seeks to ﬁnd out if such attacks can be
quantiﬁed and their impact on an already challenged network.
Research Question 5:
In the next couple of years, VANETs for ITS will involve the deployment of millions of
vehicles. It is vital that any security solution is scalable enough to accommodate their
dynamic operating environment. The ﬁnal research question will address scalability
issues with the proposed solutions above. Speciﬁcally, the thesis considers an extension
to the proposed scheme in Chapter 4 and addresses a full deployment scenario
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1.4 Summary of Main Contributions
This thesis focuses on developing solutions to the issues raised in the previous sections
as it relates to security and location privacy in disconnected ITS environments. The
major contributions of the thesis are as follows:
• In this thesis, an extensive literature review was undertaken to study existing
security and privacy schemes and identify some research gaps that informed the
proposed solutions.
• This thesis identiﬁed and summarised a variety of ITS deployment issues and
attributes in challenged environments, for example in the early stage deployment
of VANETs.
• An analytical as well as simulation based characterization of location privacy in
ITS using a disconnected VANET model is studied in order to understand the
location privacy problem better and propose a solution.
• The thesis explored a group communication scheme for location privacy which
considers the attacker strength, vehicle density, and the anonymity duration in
the level of privacy achieved.
• The PriSerV scheme is proposed as a location privacy solution that utilizes game
theory to achieve location privacy especially in low vehicle density VANETs in the
presence of selﬁsh vehicles. PriSerV is based on on-the-ﬂy mix-zone formation as
described in the objectives above.
• The thesis also proposed a revocation solution tailored to challenged ITS environ-
ments. This is achieved through a trust-based incentive scheme that ﬁlters out
malicious vehicles and revokes their certiﬁcates.
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• Finally, the thesis discusses the scalability of the proposed schemes using the
PriSerV solution above as an example.
1.5 Research Signiﬁcance and Limitations
Table 1.1: Comparison of Diﬀerent PET Schemes
PETs Disconnected Networks Safety Applications Infrastructure Support
Mix-Zone Not suitable Yes Yes
Silent Period Not suitable Not suitable Yes
Location Obfuscation Not suitable Not suitable Yes
k-Anonymity Not suitable Not suitable Yes
Proposed Scheme Yes Suitable No
The research conducted in this thesis focused on the early deployment of VANETs. It
analysed some existing PETs namely mix-zones, silent period, group communication, k-
Anonymity, and location obfuscation which are evaluated and compared with the novel
schemes proposed. The thesis also considered the use of a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) which is not feasible in low infrastructure scenarios. The proposed privacy scheme
performed better and is more suitable for disconnected networks under the simulation
conditions investigated compared to existing schemes.
The existing PETS are not adequate for DTNs due to the following reasons. First, they
heavily depend on the number of neighbouring vehicles which limits their eﬀectiveness
in low vehicle density scenarios with leading to limited collaborators. Second, in order
to prevent an attacker from tracking a vehicle's location, the mix-zone duration need
to be reasonably long to ensure the desired privacy level is achieved. However, this is
diﬃcult since the low density and opportunistic contact makes sustaining a mix-zone for
a reasonable period challenging in DTNs. Lastly, the privacy schemes assume that each
vehicle is willing to collaborate with the neighbours to change their pseudonyms. How-
ever, a selﬁsh vehicle may not be willing to participate because of low privacy beneﬁt.
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Table 1.1 is a summary of the diﬀerent PETs and the proposed scheme highlighting their
weaknesses and capabilities in terms of network scenario, the nature of the application
(this thesis considered only safety messages in the form of beacons) and infrastructure
support.
The traditional mix-zone scheme is not suitable for deployment in constrained networks
since it requires infrastructure support which may not exist or be adequately deployed
in early-stage installations[12]. It is also diﬃcult to ﬁnd an appropriate balance be-
tween the positioning of a mix-zone and the level of privacy desired [13]. The thesis,
therefore, proposed the dynamic mix-zone scheme where infrastructure support is not
needed. However, it is possible to adapt and tweak the proposed scheme to suit more
complex applications in the future when technologies such as 5G become mainstream
even in rural areas. The silent period and location obfuscation techniques are not suit-
able for deployment in constrained networks because safety applications are critical
and time-sensitive[14]. The silent period technique is inadequate because it is prone
to frequently missed beacons during vehicles' radio silence periods [14]. The location
obfuscation technique depends on third parties such as an obfuscation server to function
which leads to high communication delay and defeats the requirement for safety. The
location obfuscation server also acts as a single point of failure and is an easy target for
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
Location privacy is not well addressed in standardization eﬀorts because it is diﬃcult
to quantify with many metrics proposed for its measurement[15]. It is also often hard
to compare results obtained using the diﬀerent metrics [16]. In terms of performance,
more validation may be needed using testbeds prior to the full-scale deployment of the
proposed schemes because some of the vehicle's attributes such as physical characteris-
tics are not considered in the simulations. Some of the results obtained may be aﬀected
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if diﬀerent vehicle properties are considered. Firstly, the frequency of beacon updates
may aﬀect the tracking success of the attacker. Secondly, the physical characteristics of
the network such as wireless interference and the hidden node problem (especially in real
life deployments) which are not considered in the simulations may also aﬀect the success
of the attacker and eﬃciency of the proposed scheme. Hence, more realistic simulation
and emulations may be needed to consolidate or improve the results obtained. Thirdly,
the thesis did not consider vehicle attributes such physical dimensions which may aﬀect
the number of cars travelling on a highway in the experiments performed. The number
of the attackers deployed especially at complex road junctions may also contribute to
the tracking success of the attacker. Future research may be needed to consider the use
of multiple trackers to study their impact on correlating vehicle movements for tracking.
One method to achieve this may involve the deployment of an attacker with multiple
long-range antennas that are able to perform Sybil attacks. The thesis only considered
safety messages. With more complex applications envisaged especially in a large-scale
deployment using technologies such as 5G and IoT in the future, it will be interesting to
study how the system performs under these conditions. For example, a network running
multiple applications and protocols in addition to safety messages. The recent work by
[17] in their eﬀort to develop a holistic network layer for VANETs is a motivation and
a good place to start. Safety messages are not multi-hop applications, therefore the
scheme may also need to be adapted for experimentation in multi-hop environments.
While the applicability of the contributions made in the thesis is speciﬁc to constrained
networks, it is possible to adapt and extend the proposed schemes with minor changes
to suit a variety of other scenarios such as the large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) for
ﬁeld and military deployments. With the imminent roll-out of technologies such as 5G,
some of the issues considered such as disconnectedness will perhaps be alleviated. How-
ever, the problem of privacy will remain and probably be more ampliﬁed since there will
be more devices communicating through a variety of means. This means that security-
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wise, the attacker will have more attack surfaces to exploit. However, vehicles can still
beneﬁt from the proposed privacy technique both in urban and rural areas.
1.6 List of Publications
The following list of publications are related to this thesis:
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1.7 Thesis Structure
The six chapters of the thesis are organized to reﬂect the set objectives in 1.3 and the
contributions outlined in Section 1.4 as follows:
In Chapter 2, the thesis provides a formal introduction to VANETs. This includes a
discussion of the similarities between DTN and IT architectures in the early stages of
deployment. This chapter summarises the security and privacy threats/attacks peculiar
to these architectures of ITS. The Opportunistic NEtwork (ONE) simulator which is the
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simulation tool of choice is brieﬂy introduced with justiﬁcations for its choice. A review
of existing literature on security and location privacy in challenged ITS environments
is explored. The thesis identiﬁed some research gaps which informed the proposed
solutions to ﬁll in the gaps identiﬁed. This chapter concludes with a summary of the
contributions made and provides a pointer into the chapters that follow.
The work in Chapter 3 includes eﬀorts to characterise the location privacy problem in
disconnected VANETs. This informs the ﬁrst contribution towards providing location
privacy in VANETs based on mix-zone and group communication. The proposal includes
simulation studies of the privacy attacker.
In Chapter 4, the thesis proposes an eﬃcient location privacy scheme (PriSerV) for
disconnected VANETs based on on-the-ﬂy dynamic mix-zones and game theory. This
is in line with the observation that existing mix-zones are not ﬂexible enough in sparse
networks in addition to the threat they pose to vehicles in terms of the predictability
of pseudonym change times. The observation in Chapter 3 is vital for this contribution
as it provides an insight into a valid privacy solution especially in low vehicle density
VANETs. The feasibility of the proposed scheme is supported by simulations.
The focus in Chapter 5 is on providing a scalable revocation solution for disconnected
VANETs. The proposed scheme is accompanied by a misbehaviour detection scheme
based on trust and opinion reporting. The contribution here is three-fold: a system
based on malicious vehicle detection, misbehaviour mitigation and revocation schemes.
Finally, in Chapter 6, the thesis provides a summary of the ﬁndings and conclusions.
The thesis also give possible future research directions and recommendations for how
the research can be extended/improved. An appendix is also provided (Appendices A
and B).
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The chapter provides a general overview of VANETs and ITS technology. This is fol-
lowed by a brief discussion on the relationship between VANET/ITS at the early stages
of deployment and DTNs. This necessitates the discussion about the ONE simulator as
a tool of choice for the simulations carried out in the thesis. The major contributions in
this chapter is a general introduction to security and privacy challenges and discussions
on the existing schemes to address them. The outcome of the literature on existing
threats, attack and proposed solutions inspired some of the research gaps identiﬁed and
the proposed solutions which are discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
2.2 Overview of VANETs for ITS
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) is the application of Mobile Ad-hoc Network
(MANET) techniques for wireless communication between vehicles in a vehicle-to-
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vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication fashion. Intelligent
Transport Systems (ITS) is an example of the application of VANETs. VANETs are
characterised by high node mobility, diverse driver behaviour, highly dynamic topology,
multi-hop communications, as well as strict security and privacy requirements due to
the hostile environments in which they operate.
The ITS framework facilitates the intelligent collection, analysis and exchange of vari-
ous forms of context-aware information by vehicles with one another through a variety
of data collectors in the form of sensor devices [8]. The ability of vehicles to collect and
share information in this manner can be exploited for a myriad of beneﬁcial applica-
tions such as emergency warning, adaptive cruise control, traﬃc information services,
automatic tolling and improved road safety. Fig. 2.1 oﬀers an example use case of Ve-
hicular Communication Systems (VCS) for emergency warning and safe driving where
oncoming vehicles are warned of the danger ahead after an accident on the road. This
way, approaching drivers can take alternative routes while emergency oﬃcials attend to
the scene.
Several years of research in wireless networks have seen a variety of wireless communi-
cation technologies suggested for use in VANET for ITS. Notable among them are Blue-
tooth, RFID, infrared, mm-Wave, WiMax, 3G, 4G(LTE), legacy IEEE 802.11 standards,
WAVE (802.11p), and 5G in the near future [18, 19, 20, 21]. Each of these technologies
is only partially suitable for limited aspects of the requirements for VANETs for ITS
such as inter-connectivity solutions between ITS stations and mobile phone in the case
of 4G(LTE).
Although ITS holds much potential especially for road safety, security and privacy re-
main a major issue threatening its full realisation and eventual acceptance by users(drivers).
Security and privacy in VANETs have attracted a large volume of research attention
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Figure 2.1: Example use of VANETs for Road Safety Application [1]
from automotive industries and educational institutions in the last few years. Due to
the hostile wireless environment in which they operate, a variety of threats and attacks
are possible. An example attack is shown in Fig. 2.2 where a Denial of Service (DoS)
attacker prevents vehicles from communicating with other vehicles. This makes it im-
possible for them to get notiﬁcations of accidents. Both mild and severe DoS attacks
can potentially lead to traﬃc delays, congestion and/or disruption to a driver's journey.
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Figure 2.2: DoS Attack in Vehicular Communication [2]
Another example of the threat to security in terms of message forgery attack is shown in
Fig. 2.3. In this example, the attacker announces that a fake incident (e.g. a collision)
occurred on the road to a set of vehicles, advising drivers to perform manoeuvres that
may lead to real accidents.
The IEEE 1609 protocol [22, 23, 24] has become the de-facto standard for Wireless
Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE), on which ITS technology is based. The
inherent inadequacy of Quality of Service (QoS) features of the Distribution Coordinated
2.2. Overview of VANETs for ITS 19
Figure 2.3: Message Forgery Attack in Vehicular Communication [2]
Function (DCF) based PHY/MAC layer of IEEE 802.11, including security and privacy
requirements are the key motivations for the IEEE Work Group 1609. A brief overview
of the WAVE technology is presented in the sections that follow.
2.2.1 Overview of VANET Architecture for ITS
The IEEE 1609 is a family of standards for WAVE that deﬁne an architecture and a
complementary set of standardized services and interfaces that altogether enable se-
cure vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) wireless communica-
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tions. The standards form the basic foundation for a broad range of applications in
the transportation environment, including vehicle safety, automated tolling, enhanced
navigation, traﬃc management and many others as outlined earlier.
Figure 2.4: The IEEE 1609 Reference Architecture and Standards [3]
The IEEE 1609 family, shown in Fig. 2.4, comprises frameworks for diﬀerent func-
tionalities namely the networking and management functions, security, resource man-
agement, and support for multi-channel operations. The IEEE 802.11p being the base
implementation of the IEEE 1609 family, speciﬁes physical access and medium access
control (PHY/MAC) [25]. The IEEE 1609.1 speciﬁes standards for WAVE resource
manager, designed for remote management of WAVE devices such as On-Board Units
(OBUs). The IEEE 1609.2, which will be discussed in detail in Section 2.5.1, speciﬁes
security services and formats for secure message exchange between VANET entities. It
also deﬁnes speciﬁcations for location privacy in vehicular communication. The IEEE
1609.3 deﬁnes network and transport layer services such as routing and addressing. The
IEEE 1609.4 deﬁnes mechanisms for vehicles to communicate simultaneously on multi-
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ple channels also known as multi-channel operation. The security services of the IEEE
1609.2 standard are discussed in detail in section 2.5.1. The provision for dependency
among the diﬀerent layers which makes it possible to achieve eﬀective security services
is explained. Note that the 75 MHz spectrum is speciﬁcally dedicated the United States
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the 5.9 GHz band for ITS.
2.2.2 Introduction to DTNs and the ONE Simulator
DTN architectures are designed to cope with the limitations in network connectivity
caused by frequent topology changes, inadequate infrastructure support, end-to-end
delays, mobility and short-range radios. Delay-tolerant networks suﬀer from network
partitions, hence packet delivery relies on opportunistic contacts between nodes in a
store-carry-and-forward manner. The infrequent connections often lead to missed or
opportunistic encounters which reduces network throughput [26, 27]. A plethora of
techniques have been proposed focusing on improvements in routing eﬃciency in DTNs
in the form of routing protocols and infrastructure support. Some similarities exist
between VANETs and DTNs in that VANETs at the early stage of deployment with
inadequate infrastructure exhibit the attributes of DTNs. Several works have inves-
tigated the use of DTN-like protocols in vehicular scenarios. Notable among them is
the pioneering work of [9, 28], that proposed the use stationary RSUs in VDTNs for
performance improvements. Their simulations show performance improvements over
classical DTNs. The authors in [26] propose the use of throw-boxes in mobile DTNs to
induce more contact opportunities, consequently improving the performance of the net-
work. Similar to RSUs, throw-boxes are wireless nodes that act as relay nodes, creating
additional contact opportunities in the DTN.
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The ONE Simulator for DTN Protocol Evaluation
The Opportunistic Networking Environment (ONE) simulator is speciﬁcally designed
for evaluating DTN routing and application protocols [29]. It allows users to create
scenarios based on diﬀerent synthetic movement models and real-world traces and oﬀers
a framework for implementing routing and application protocols. The simulator has in-
built routing protocols namely Spray &Wait, ProPHET, MaxProp, Epidemic, and First
Contact. It allows for interactive visualization and post-processing tools that supports
evaluating experiments as well as an emulation mode which makes it possible for the
simulator to become part of real-world test-beds. Example simulations to demonstrate
the simulator's ﬂexible support for DTN protocol evaluation abounds in [29]. As this
thesis does not focus on routing eﬃciency, it does not pay much attention to routing
protocols. This is justiﬁed by the choice of speciﬁc protocols in each experiment carried
out in Chapter 3, 4, and 5. A more detailed discussion on the ONE simulator including
the aforementioned routing protocols is provided in Appendix A.
2.3 Requirements for Security and Privacy Designs in ITS
In this section, the thesis discusses the basic primitives needed to facilitate and achieve
a robust security and privacy solution in VC systems.
2.3.1 Authentication
Authentication is a security mechanism used to ensure the validity of various messages
and their properties such as the sender's identity, location, message quality and validity.
Data origin or entity authentication ensures the validity of the origin of a message or
the application group within the IEEE 802.11p framework it originated from. Vehicles
use digital certiﬁcates to sign messages which can be veriﬁed by recipients. A digital
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signature typically contains details such as the identity of a vehicle or its role, public
key, validity period, and its signature. Authentication also ensures that the contents of
messages (message quality) are not altered in transit by a malicious vehicle especially
in multi-hop routing scenarios where messages are passed through intermediary vehicles
en-route to their destination. Authentication can help prevent replay attacks in which
location and time stamp information are altered to deceive message recipients.
2.3.2 Access Control
The majority of attacks on VC systems are possible through genuine or back-door
access to the network system. Access rights breaches throw the security door open
for other high-level attacks for the adversary to execute. Therefore, authentication and
authorization mechanisms are used to provide access control policies that determine who
gets access, how the network is used, and what the user can do on the network. The
SeVeCom project proposes system-wide access control policies through authorization
and authentication mechanisms on what roles vehicles can play, or what protocols a
vehicle can execute in the network [30].
2.3.3 Data Integrity
Forged alerts can undermine the safety of users of the VC system and mislead other
road users about the road events. Data integrity check ensures that messages altered
in transit are detected and discarded, and the originating malicious vehicles reported
and barred from using the network. An adversary can intercept a message meant for
sender, alter its position information and forward to other vehicles in order to deceive
them about sender position. Integrity checks should be put in place to ensure that
such forged messages by malicious or revoked vehicles are detected and not accepted by
the system or processed further by vehicles which have received the messages. Vehicle
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resources such as battery and bandwidth can also be wasted in processing false alerts.
2.3.4 Availability
Vehicular networks must be highly available and ensure quick response time to support
diﬀerent applications [17]. For instance, DoS attacks and message delay attacks can lead
to road mishaps where vehicles fail to access the VC system or messages are delayed
by a malicious attacker. The system should ensure mechanisms or countermeasures
to minimize the compound eﬀect of DoS attacks and strive for high availability. High
availability for VC systems especially in Intermittently Connected VANETs in rural
areas can be ensured by using alternative technologies, deploying RSUs, and using delay
tolerant routing protocols as used in Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) and Vehicular
DTNs (VDTNs) [28]. It is also necessary to provide other access technologies as a
backup in case of failure due to a DoS attack. Multiple access technologies can be
used in safety-critical applications such as revocation using certiﬁcate revocation lists
(CRLs) as seen in driver-less vehicle technologies with a variety of sensors [31]. The
idea of multiple access technologies is corroborated in standard ETSI documents which
suggests that diﬀerent networks shall provide support for at least one of the use cases
of road safety, traﬃc eﬃciency, infotainment and business applications. In a case where
the communication within a single network does not meet all the requirements of all
applications and use cases, a combination of networks is envisioned, in which multiple
ITS access and networking technologies are applied [32].
2.3.5 Privacy and Anonymity
Privacy is a huge subject in VC systems. Vehicle details such as location, driving speed
and routes can be used by malicious vehicles or a compromised authority to identify a
driver. Privacy in VC systems is mostly concerned with location privacy. The systems
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should ensure that a malicious vehicle cannot easily track the whereabouts of a vehicle
using its location updates. The ability of the system to ensure personal identifying
information about a driver is not disclosed to third parties has become a mandatory
feature of VANET security protocols. Hence, the network must ensure that the activi-
ties of drivers cannot be traced by the malicious vehicles or spying government agencies.
However, conditional privacy stipulates that it should be possible to reveal the identity
of oﬀending drivers for revocation purposes and criminal prosecution. Anonymity is a
method of hiding the physical identity of a vehicle. The Vehicular Public Key Infras-
tructure (VPKI) should ensure a means to oﬀer conditional anonymity to drivers by
separating vehicular information from personal information about drivers during com-
munication. Conditional privacy means that, in the event that a vehicle misbehaves, it
can still be traced and held accountable for its actions.
2.3.6 Conﬁdentiality
Conﬁdentiality provision of the VPKI ensures that messages cannot be easily read by
third parties even if they are intercepted. Even if a message is intercepted by an
adversary, it should not be possible for the adversary to understand or decipher the
message. For reasons of safety, message conﬁdentiality is not be implemented for emer-
gency vehicles because they do not send any sensitive information and do not require
anonymity. Hence, broadcast applications such as Decentralized Environmental Noti-
ﬁcation Message (DENM) and Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM) do not require
conﬁdentiality.
2.3.7 Non-Repudiation
It should not be possible for a vehicle to falsely deny conducting a transaction on the
network such as sending or receiving messages. The non-repudiation mechanism also
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ensures there is enough evidence to hold them accountable for misbehaviour. Even if a
vehicle sends a message in anonymity, it should be possible for the authorities to resolve
the vehicle's anonymous identity to its real identity for criminal prosecution. Digital
certiﬁcates used for message signing provide non-repudiation. When vehicles receive
messages, the accompanying digital certiﬁcates can be stored and later used to resolve
issues about the message and its content.
2.4 Threats and Attacks on VC Systems
This section contains an outline of diﬀerent attacks against VC systems. The discussion
here is tailored to address diﬀerent security and privacy requirements as discussed above.
It discusses how various attacks and threats aﬀect speciﬁc requirements of the VC
systems such as availability, authentication, privacy, non-repudiation, and integrity.
2.4.1 Attack on Availability
Damages can occur even within a short interval of time that the entire system or any
of its key components (e.g. the RSU) is is rendered unavailable. A major type of
attack on availability include various forms of network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
In DoS attacks aﬀecting the communication channel availability, enormous bursts of
packets are injected into the network beyond the processing capacity of the network
thereby choking bandwidth resources. DoS attacks generally disrupt a system and end
up denying vehicles of resources such as bandwidth. Another form of DoS attack that
can aﬀect a VC system's communication is where the OBU of the TPD is overloaded,
thereby exhausting the computational abilities of the OBU such as disk space and
battery energy. The main purpose of DoS attacks is to deny legitimate users access
to the network resources. Robustness against DoS attacks is a prime requirement for
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secure VC systems as stated earlier. Legitimate vehicles with faulty radios can also send
unwanted broadcasts and overwhelm network resources.
2.4.2 Attacks on Vehicle and User Privacy
Privacy attacks are direct and indirect threats to the conﬁdentiality of user location,
identity, and message content. Privacy attacks can be of two related forms: Location
Privacy Attacks (LPAs) otherwise known as location tracking attacks and identity at-
tacks. The close-knit relationship between a vehicle and its driver makes tracking easy.
This is because tracking a vehicle's whereabouts (location privacy attack) is as good as
tracking its driver (identity privacy attack). In location privacy attacks, the adver-
sary uses collected snapshots of a vehicle's location traces to reconstruct its whereabouts
[33]. The reconstructed details can be used to regenerate user proﬁle and identity for
blackmailing and stalking.
There are also identity impersonation attacks where the adversary fakes the iden-
tity of another, sometimes non-existent vehicle in the network. It can happen when
the adversary acquires the private key of another vehicle. Multiple identity attacks,
more formally called Sybil attacks [34, 35, 36] occur when the adversary pretends to
represent multiple vehicles to get substantial inﬂuence over the network. The malicious
vehicles that cause Sybil attacks can be called Sybil vehicles. Sybil attacks can enhance
the chances of other forms of attacks such as DoS where a vehicle pretends to be mul-
tiple other vehicles to ﬂood the network with packets. Sybil vehicles can also cheat
on the network by sending false location and position updates and mislead other vehi-
cles via decisions regarding position and location. Sybil vehicles can be self-motivated
or due to faulty sensors. Generally, LPAs are facilitated by methods utilizing traﬃc
analysis [37, 38] with the intention to de-anonymize a communication session and re-
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veal user identity. Implementing privacy protection measures in VC systems is hard
because it often conﬂicts with security primitives. For instance, anonymity conﬂicts
with accountability while security conﬂicts with eﬃciency. Hence, conditional privacy
is recommended for VC systems to ensure that, although a vehicle can stay anonymous,
law enforcement agents should be able to resolve its real identity for prosecution in the
event of established misbehaviour.
2.4.3 Attacks on Anonymity
Anonymity and pseudonymity are required to achieve privacy. The IEEE 1609.2 sup-
ports the use of VPKI for adaptive selection of pseudonyms to reduce traceability by
malicious vehicles. However, without proper pseudonym selection design, an adversary
can forge pseudonyms at will for the purpose of committing a crime and anti-social
purposes.
2.4.4 Attacks on Exchanged Messages
Accurate location and topology information is key to accurate packet dissemination in
geographic routing-based networks such as VC networks [39]. Various forms of attack
on location information include forging, modiﬁcation, dropping, and replay of messages.
Dropping of packets that carry emergency information about the location details for a
rescue operation can result in diﬃculties with the rescue and the intended recipient
vehicle being misled because it fails to receive the information it needs. If a vehicle
pretends to be several other vehicles, it may report diﬀerent location and position
information at the same time or in intervals of time. Another form of position cheating
might occur where a vehicle reports false speed and acceleration information - this can
lead to a head-on collision involving approaching vehicles.
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2.4.5 Attacks on User Authentication
Safety messages in VC require proper authentication to prevent vehicles from sending
bogus messages which could put lives at risk. Vehicle identity authentication is also
critical to safety objectives. Authentication attacks are usually carried out by insiders
who are properly registered with the network. It has been shown that Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) used in the IEEE 1609.2 framework requires 7ms
to verify a single ECDSA signature whereas it is possible for the adversary to send a
forged credential in much less time. Examples of authentication-based attacks are given
as follows:
- A masquerade attacker is a vehicle with a stolen identity. An attacker can become a
masquerade if it obtains a vehicle's private key and signs messages as the owner. Since
private keys are unique to the user in a digital signature scheme, they can be diﬃcult to
detect. The attacker can be a major threat and be able to launch other forms of attack
in the network because the identity is genuine. An example of a masquerade attack can
occur when a roadside infrastructure pretends to be an OBU and mislead other vehicles
about its location. Since RSU locations are well known, this type of attack can have
serious safety consequences, especially in emergencies. Masquerades are usually very
diﬃcult to detect since the adversary seems to operate under a genuine identity.
- In replay attacks, the adversary resends or replays captured messages. The captured
messages are often delayed or adulterated before being forwarded to misinform the
recipient.
- Spooﬁng attacks relates to various forms of identity hiding where the adversary
illegally hides its real identity. Three popular spooﬁng attacks are possible in VC
systems: GPS spooﬁng, MAC and IP address spooﬁng. In GPS spooﬁng, the adversary
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hides its real location by announcing false GPS location. Usually, the adversary tries to
send a stronger satellite signal than the real GPS signal from a real satellite. Because
of the stronger signal reported by the adversary, susceptible vehicles will accept the
location information reported by the adversary. In MAC and IP spooﬁng, the adversary
tries to hide its MAC and IP address to conduct illegal activities.
-Illusion-Based Attacks An illusion attack which was ﬁrst reported in [40] is a rel-
atively new type of authentication attacks where the adversary induces neighbouring
vehicles to transmit incorrect data such as location information. The authors argue that
traditional authentication mechanisms are not enough to prevent illusion attacks. The
authors propose a plausibility validation network (PVN) where plausibility validation
checks for proof of correctness on sensor data are carried out.
2.4.6 Reputation-Based Attacks
In trust-based VC schemes, the eviction of misbehaving nodes is based on the reputation
of a vehicle. Vehicles with better behaviour pattern over time are more trusted than
those with a lower trust index. Usually, the VC system relies on rumours from other
members of the system to assign trust levels. In [41], the authors proposed a reputation
system based on direct contact and piggybacking for trust decisions. This could be
measured by the number of unacknowledged packets sent over the appraisal period.
Therefore, a vehicle has to build enough reputation to show a good record. However,
it is possible for vehicles to collaborate to give false reputation reports to enhance the
chances of their malicious collaborators. Reputation-based attacks have not been well
reported in the literature. However, smart vehicles of the future can collaborate to
form a mini-community of malicious announcers. In a large-scale VC network, multiple
malicious communities could scale to regions and collaborate across borders.
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2.4.7 Brute Force Attacks
Brute force attacks are cryptanalytic attacks on the key generation system of computer
networks. The IEEE 1609.2 uses Elliptic Curve Cryptography, hence VC systems are
not exempt from brute force attacks. In brute force attacks, the adversary gradually
guesses possible keys till a match is found. The use of unique keys for authentication
could make it possible for the adversary to capture the keys during the authentication
phase to an authority [39]. Concatenating random numbers to the unique key could
prevent brute force attacks. However, the chances of guessing a key depends on the key-
length, hence longer keys require more processing power to get cracked by the malicious
entity.
2.4.8 Non-repudiation Based Attacks
Non-repudiation attacks occur when a vehicle or an application denies involvement and
responsibility for its actions such as sending malicious data. One of the ways in which
a group of vehicles or applications can execute a non-repudiation attack is if similar
applications or vehicles happen to share identical credentials. There is a diﬀerence be-
tween an impersonation attack and non-repudiation attack. A non-repudiation attack
involves two colluding entities in order to deny their actions. However, an adequate
secure key management mechanism can be used to reduce the chances of issuing iden-
tical credentials to applications or vehicles using secure Tamper-proof Devices (TPDs).
Tamper-proof devices provide secure storage for keys and certiﬁcates and may store the
history of messages exchanged between vehicles over external communication channels.
They also act as Event Data Recorders (EDRs) and can be used for legal purposes [42].
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2.5 Security and Privacy Enhancing Techniques for VANETs
A plethora of threats and attacks still exists, made even more serious by the ubiquity of
today's technology such as IoVs and IoTs. In this section, a variety of new and legacy
techniques that address the many challenges related to routing, security and privacy in
VANETs is discussed. Since the IEEE 802.11p framework inherits most of the native
security issues inherent in the parent standard namely the IEEE 802.11 standard, the
discussion starts with the provisions made in the IEEE 802.11p framework for security
and privacy. The IEEE 1609.2 standard is reviewed in detail, then existing security and
privacy enhancing technologies for VANETs are explored.
2.5.1 The IEEE 1609.2 Security Framework
The IEEE 1609.2 standard oﬀers services that provide support on security primitives
namely conﬁdentiality, authentication, authorization, and message integrity. The details
of the subject of the IEEE 1609.2 security architecture is too voluminous to ﬁt into this
report. However, the most important functional aspects relevant to this thesis are
discussed. Fig. 2.5 is an architecture that shows the various security services available
to applications and services at diﬀerent layers of the IEEE 802.11p communication
stack.
The IEEE 1609.2 system security suite comprises 1) a CME for managing security
certiﬁcates, 2) a certiﬁcate public key for a public key crypto-system; and 3) a list of
permissions or access rights associated with that public key. The IEEE 1609.2 clause
also speciﬁes formats for public keys, signature, certiﬁcate and certiﬁcate revocation
lists (CRLs).
The standard speciﬁes the format and methods for secure access, processing, and mes-
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Figure 2.5: IEEE 1609.2 Architecture for Secure WAVE Message Exchange[4]
sage dissemination including management of WAVE messages. It also describes the
format for WAVE certiﬁcates, cryptographic keys, and encryption methods. The archi-
tecture is designed to ﬁt into well established public key cryptographic standards. It
also supports principles for revocation of expired certiﬁcates or faulty vehicles using a
Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI).
As the standard does not specify privacy issues such as identiﬁcation of users and
protection of privacy, such privacy issues are left open [1].
The mechanism of the functions in the IEEE 1609.2 is given with an example as shown
in Fig. 2.6. In this example, Alice's vehicle, VA (message sender) and Bob's vehicle, VB
(message receiver) need to securely exchange a message i.e. m, via the vehicular commu-
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nication network. VA and VB could also interact with the roadside infrastructure (R)
in V2R mode, or the certiﬁcate authority (CA). The vehicles and the CA cannot send
messages unless they have a certiﬁcate with which to sign the messages. Management
of certiﬁcates such as the revocation of expired or faulty vehicles is an all-important
feature of the IEEE 1609.2 security clause. Request for certiﬁcates and CRLs to the CA
is the job of the CME module. Again, both vehicles and CAs must support the CME
module for managing security-related messages. In Fig. 2.6, the sender must acquire a
certiﬁcate from the CA before it can send safety messages to the receiver.
Once a certiﬁcate is acquired, the signing of messages prior to sending is left to the
IEEE 1609.2. Usually, mutual authentication is required for communication between
a vehicle and CA using two types of security management certiﬁcates: (1) certiﬁcate
signing request (CSR) certiﬁcate and (2) CA certiﬁcate. During mutual authentication,
a vehicle authenticates to the CA with CSR while the CA uses the CA certiﬁcate to
authenticate to the vehicle. Prior to certiﬁcate acquisition, vehicles use message CSR
certiﬁcates to sign the CSR messages they send to the Message CAs to request certiﬁ-
cates. In a similar manner, Wave Service Advertisement (WSA) signers authenticate to
the WSA CAs by sending WSA CSR certiﬁcates to the CA.
The security service module controls and manages the secure processing of data and
WAVE service advertisements (WSA). The CME manages information regarding the
validity of credentials and processes data about certiﬁcates and public/private keys.
Hence, it plays a major role in the revocation of expired/malicious entities. The
CME also handles services oﬀered by the Provider Service Security Management Entity
(PSSME). Generally, the security services support signing, veriﬁcation, encryption and
decryption of the following: protocol data units (PDUs), WSAs, management of crypto-
materials for generating certiﬁcate requests and responses. In the context of WAVE-
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Figure 2.6: An Example IEEE 1609.2 Secure WAVE Message Exchange [1]
compliant vehicles, security service consumers rely on the security services subsystem.
The framework deﬁnes three types of consumers namely, higher-layer applications and
protocols, WAVE provider services that provide support for end users and applications,
and WAVE management entity for end devices [43].
Security data stores (SDSs) are security banks used to hold security related information.
Depending on the scope of the information, two classes of SDSs are deﬁned in the IEEE
1609.2 framework. Message SDSs hold security data for each local consumer on a
vehicle, while security data for the whole security subsystem is held in the global SDSs.
The security subsystem can also leverage on the support services provided by the host
system such as current time, location information, and random number generation for
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security services. Basically, functional entities are inter-dependent and interact with
each other through intermediary service access points (SAPs). The CME in Fig. 2.5
has two (SAPs) that provide means for other entities to interact so as to access security
management information: the security processing services uses the (CME-Sec-SAP),
while other services use the (CME-SAP).
2.5.2 Review of Existing Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
Recall that the IEEE 802.11p speciﬁcation is rather vague in its approach to privacy.
In this section, the thesis discusses existing PETs that are peculiar to VANET environ-
ments. In VC systems, the objective is generally to limit traceability of a vehicle by the
adversary i.e. ensure location privacy.
Anonymous Communication using Pseudonyms
Anonymous communications using pseudonymous was ﬁrst proposed in [44]. It is a tech-
nique in which vehicles exchange location information under alternative identities oth-
erwise known as pseudonyms instead of their original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
identities. This way, it becomes diﬃcult for a privacy attacker to link vehicle to the
location messages they exchange. Pseudonyms are issued in such a way that they do not
contain any piece of identiﬁable information related to the real identity of the vehicle
that may lead to proﬁling the driver since both have a close-knit relationship. To further
enhance anonymity, the use of frequently changing pseudonyms is advocated in [45] and
has been adopted in various proposals as the de facto method for addressing anony-
mous communication. During the exchange of messages, each pseudonym is signed by
a pseudonym certiﬁcate. The use of pseudonym certiﬁcates ensure added security to
prevent vehicles from forging pseudonyms. Fig. 2.7 summarises the four phases of the
pseudonym cycle including its request and acquisition.
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• Phase 1, the vehicle is issued a base identity. The issuer could be the OEM or a
third party such as the CA through a PKI.
• Phase 2, the vehicle authenticates itself to an authority (CA/RA).
• Phase 3, if Phase 2 is successful, pseudonyms are issued together with certiﬁcates
for signing messages.
• Phase 4, the vehicle communicates using the pseudonyms obtained in Phase 3.
It is also possible to assign each pseudonym a private-public key pair for added pri-
vacy. However, using private-public key pairs implies increased security overhead and
memory requirement. Note that CA and RA do not necessarily have to be separate en-
tities. However, the separation of functions may be advantageous in that it encourages
collaborative resolution and revocation as discussed in [46].
Mix-zone Techniques
Mix zones are ﬁxed locations where a group of vehicles with similar attributes such
as travel direction and speed can synchronously change their pseudonyms in order to
evade tracking by a privacy attacker [47]. Mix-zones address the shortcoming of the
pseudonym scheme by designating locations where vehicles can change their pseudonym
without being observed by an attacker. Depending on implementation, vehicles do not
send sensitive information for the duration of the mix-zone. The level of privacy achieved
using mix-zones can be measured with quantiﬁed metrics namely the anonymity of the
mix-zone. A variety of mix-zones have been proposed since the work described in [47].
Notable among them is the cryptographic mix-zone (CMIX) protocol proposed in [48].
However, most of the existing mix-zone schemes are not ﬂexible and vehicle are forced to
change pseudonyms even when they have no need to. Again, their eﬀectiveness depends
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Figure 2.7: An example of a pseudonym pycle based on Vehicular Public Key Infras-
tructure (VPKI)
on the vehicle density and they fail in the presence of selﬁsh vehicles that are eager to
conserve resources. Typical places to implement mix zones are road intersections and
places where vehicles frequently meet such as parking lots. Within the mix-zone, it is
assumed that a user has full anonymity within a pool of other users. With the mix-
zone, unlinkability is achieved through encryption of messages using group secret keys.
However, mix-zones are susceptible to attack by internal adversaries since everyone
belonging to the zone has access to all the node information within the network. An
extension to the CMIX protocol [48] proposed by Carianha et al. [49] addresses this
loophole.
The eﬀectiveness of mix-zones relies on the timing and the frequency of the change. Too
frequent changes will deplete the available pseudonyms while providing more privacy
against the attacker. Synchronous changing of pseudonyms has been proposed as a
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means of tackling the above. Vehicles can synchronously change their pseudonyms
based on similarities such as travel direction and speed. This leads to a new problem
where the eﬀectiveness now depends on the number of vehicles who can cooperate to
change pseudonyms.
Group Communication
A group can be regarded as a set of vehicles that share a common interest. Vehicles
in a group use a common set of security credentials such as public and private keys,
and a group signature. The group signature which was ﬁrst proposed in [50] allows
members of the group to sign messages on behalf of vehicles belonging to the group.
A group is managed by a group manager who can be appointed by the RSU, the CA,
or by group election. All vehicles belonging to a group share a secret key with the
group leader. Group communication can be advantageous in two ways; it can be used
to improve routing eﬃciency and for secure communications. Both purposes suit the
routing and security need of disconnected VANETs. There are a number of proposals
for group communication in VANETs with emphasis on security and privacy. In [51],
the authors propose a scheme to verify the eﬀectiveness of message broadcast using
group signatures. They study the eﬀect of cryptographic and communication delay
using simulations. Results show that the delay incurred is signiﬁcant but cannot be a
huge hindrance to eﬀorts to provide security and privacy in VANETs. In [52], Verma
and Dijiang propose a group communication based scheme that performs successive
authentication with the road-side infrastructure and expedites authentication between
vehicles. A group signature based secure and privacy-preserving scheme which ensures
authenticity, data integrity, anonymity, and accountability for vehicular communication
is proposed in [53]. It includes a probabilistic signature veriﬁcation scheme which can
detect tampered messages.
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Other Anonymity Techniques
Apart from the use of pseudonyms mentioned above, there are other anonymity tech-
niques pre-dating pseudonym communication. Anonymous communication was ﬁrst
described by Chaum in [54]. In [55], Sweeney proposes a privacy technique using k -
anonymity. The model seeks to publish just enough records from a database that is
meaningful for decision making yet ensures owner privacy. Other techniques include
onion routing, MIXing, Single Proxy, and Network Coding.
2.6 Challenges and Open Research Issues
While some progress has been made by industries and research institutions in the past
few years, there is no doubt that key issues have only been partly addressed. In areas
where solutions have been identiﬁed, more eﬃcient solutions can be investigated along-
side existing schemes [56]. With increasing ﬁeld tests in the United States and Europe,
new research eﬀorts are needed that focus on practical solutions. In this section, we
ﬁrst present generic challenges and issues, then speciﬁc research gaps that inform the
contributions made in this thesis are presented.
Public Acceptance
With increasing concerns about privacy from the use of mobile devices, eﬀorts need to
be put into educating the public on the beneﬁts of vehicular communication. It is clear
that users are usually apprehensive of new disruptive technologies. Such apprehensions
arise from the obvious concern for privacy and security [57] [58] with the fear that
vehicles will be totally traceable by car manufacturers and enabled to report detailed
users statistics to the government leading to total surveillance [59] [60]. It is therefore
important to understand users' attitude to be able to draw up methods to handle their
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concerns.
Security and Privacy in Hybrid Architectures
Vehicle manufacturers are considering equipping vehicle with multiple access technolo-
gies like other mobile devices. It is obvious that these technologies have some beneﬁts
as explained in [61]. However, the hybrid architecture introduces new challenges to the
security and privacy problem. This means that a single key management scheme may
not be suitable for a hybrid VC system. It is known that security measures for mobile
networks and other technologies cannot be applied to the VC domain.
A hybrid architecture can be useful in places where IEEE 802.11p road side units are
not installed (e.g. early stages of deployment). For instance, 4G and 5G (in the future)
networks could be used to disseminate CRLs or emergency warning as backup when
IEEE 802.11p fails. Again, in the future, it will be possible to interact with smart ve-
hicles on-board electronics using portable devices such as smart phones equipped with
diﬀerent access technologies. The security architecture should ensure that security can-
not be easily compromised through third party applications running on hostile devices
since such third-party technologies can open up the system for malicious intruders and
attacks [62]. This calls for novel security and privacy schemes for such systems.
CRL Dissemination and Bandwidth Usage
Dissemination of CRLs in ITS has been researched in recent literature [63] [64]. Distri-
bution of CRLs comes at some cost to network resources such as bandwidth which leads
to delays and overheads in CRLs updates. This calls for research on more eﬃcient and
scalable CRL dissemination schemes. The scheme in [64] is a privacy preserving system
with epidemic dissemination of CRLs using parked vehicles. It promises improvements
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in dissemination speed, privacy and reduced CRL size. The work in SmartRevoc envi-
sions the early stages of adoption of ITS with a relatively small vehicle density. Although
the result is promising, it is hardly realistic in a large scale scenario.
Privacy in Pseudonym Acquisition and Revocation
During the pseudonym acquisition process, a vehicle authenticates itself to the authority
using a real identity. In order to ensure more reliable privacy, there is a need for
anonymous authentication while making sure that only genuine vehicles are granted
pseudonyms. The method of group joining in DTNs suggested in [65] can be further
investigated for ITS. In [66], the Car2car Communications Consortium suggests the use
of a Pseudonym Certiﬁcate Authority (PCA) that is under the administration of a root
certiﬁcate authority. A similar argument for privacy concern can be put forward for the
revocation process.
Privacy Assessment and Evaluation
The requirements for privacy are well established in the research domain. However, [67]
argues that it cannot be easily quantiﬁed and assessed. With ﬁeld operational tests in
diﬀerent parts of the world, adequate metrics are needed to assess and evaluate privacy
claims by diﬀerent algorithms based on real life scenarios. This will ensure consistency
in diﬀerent methods used for simulating various traﬃc scenarios.
Simulation and Evaluation Tools
While advances have been made in simulation and modelling tools, eﬀorts are needed to
ensure more realistic and consistent models for protocol veriﬁcation. In Falko et al [62],
the authors reiterate the need for a proper benchmark for modelling driver behaviour
and traﬃc deﬁnitions. They point out that most studies on VANETs are investigated
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using a singular application and new studies that investigate the impact of multiple
applications on the system are required. Singular versus multiple applications refers
to the number of applications that runs on an end device for test purposes. A vehicle
can send a variety of messages such as safety message as well as routine alert messages
simultaneously.
2.7 Identiﬁed Research Gaps Relating to VANETs for ITS
In the previous sections of this chapter, a general overview of VANETs was provided. In
the sections that follow, the overview is extended to highlight speciﬁc research challenges
addressed in this thesis which forms the core of the proposed solutions further explored
in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
2.7.1 Privacy Analysis and Evaluation
Pseudonym and mix-zone techniques have become the two de-facto and most eﬀective
means of achieving location privacy in VANETs. However, the dynamic and intermit-
tent nature of vehicle interactions presents new challenges such as an understanding of
the adversary behaviour in order to design schemes suitable for such scenarios. An un-
derstanding of the interactions of vehicles and the privacy attacker is necessary to model
and design the pseudonym change technique for intermittent VANETs using mix-zones
which forms part of the contribution made in Chapter 3. The use of mix-zones and
group communication to address location privacy is also explored in Chapter 3.
2.7.2 Location Privacy in Intermittent VANETs
Pseudonym change at mix-zones requires vehicles that synchronously change the pseudonym
in order to deceive that privacy attacker (PA). In this sense, the density of vehicles can
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be aﬀected by the vehicles arrival rate which in turn aﬀects the number of potential
collaborators. In DTN-like networks, vehicles have the need to conserve resources such
as bandwidth needed for signalling messages. This means that some vehicles become
selﬁsh and reluctant in submitting to pseudonym change requests. The proposed scheme
addresses this problem in Chapter 4 using the technique of game theory techniques to
inﬂuence the privacy dynamics in the network.
2.7.3 Fixed Mix-zones versus Dynamic Mix-zones
Traditional mix zones are ﬁxed in time and location. Hence, vehicles do not have much
ﬂexibility with how they change pseudonyms. The thesis extends the use of mix-zones
to propose dynamic mix-zones that do not restrict pseudonym change to predeﬁned
physical location and time. The use of a dynamic mix-zone scheme forms part of the
subject of Chapter 4 where vehicles can have a ﬁne-grained control over how and when
they change pseudonyms.
2.7.4 Misbehaviour Detection Schemes
While security protocols for eviction of misbehaving vehicles are necessary, VC systems
can be made safer if robust anomaly detection protocols are used. Anomaly detection
would ensure that adversaries are detected before they cause damage to the network.
Hence, it can potentially save network resources. An example of an anomaly detection
algorithm is proposed in [68]. In the example, several reports of misbehaviour from
multiple vehicles in the VC system are used to determine a vehicle's reputation. This
is achieved by having vehicle report on the sensor data they receive from their daily
interactions. An overwhelming anomaly raised against a particular is then used to
investigate maliciousness. The authors in [69] believe that it is enough to evict a vehicle
based on its deviation from normal behaviour e.g. car crash. Other systems evaluate
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misbehaviour based on such indices as dropped or duplicated packets. Some novel
research is needed towards more sophisticated anomaly detection schemes, speciﬁcally,
more robust and accurate anomaly detection schemes that will prevent the eviction of
innocent vehicles. For instance, it is not enough to evict a vehicle based on crash record
without establishing the cause of the crash.
2.7.5 Revocation of Malicious Vehicles
The nature of disconnected VANETs calls for novel schemes that emphasise eﬃcient
revocation of misbehaving vehicles. Most revocation schemes in literature do not prop-
erly address the vulnerability window. The shorter the vulnerability, the faster it is
for the inﬂuence of malicious vehicles to be managed. Some revocation protocols such
as Online Certiﬁcate Status Protocol (OCSP) are resource intensive since they require
on-demand interaction with CA, hence are not suitable for DTNs [70]. The case study
used here considered an eﬃcient delay tolerant revocation scheme to cope with the dy-
namic nature of the network. Again, selﬁsh vehicles can refuse to report misbehaviour
in order to conserve resources. An incentive scheme through which such vehicles can be
coerced into reporting misbehaviour and be rewarded has been highlighted.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, the thesis provided an extensive literature on the technology behind
VANETs for ITS. It discussed its peculiar attributes especially at the early stages of
deployment and its relationship with delay-tolerant network architectures such as DTNs.
The chapter explored a plethora of security and privacy issues, existing schemes to
address them, and the short-comings of such schemes. The addressed short-comings
informed the proposed solutions in the thesis. The chapter also summarised some of
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the identiﬁed open issues and provided an overview of the eﬀorts made to address
them. The identiﬁed areas relate to issues in heterogeneous networks, key management,
revocation and dissemination of CRLs, and scalability. In the Chapters that follow (3,
4, and 5), the thesis explore the details of the proposed solutions.
Chapter 3
Analysis of Location Privacy
Schemes in VANETs
3.1 Introduction
This chapter sets out to analyse some well-known and established location Privacy
Enhancing Techniques (PETs) in order to justify the motivation and choice of the pro-
posed solution. The PETs schemes considered include the mix-zone technique [45],
group communication scheme [71][52], Silent period[11], Cachecloak [72], Mutually Ob-
fuscating Paths(MOP)[73], k-Anonymity[55], and pseudonym change [45]. Although
some of the above schemes have been discussed in the previous chapter, the technical
details of each are highlighted here, while those not previously described have been ex-
plained. For the group communication scheme, a plethora of versions exist. Hence, we
have only demonstrated the idea behind it with basic assumptions. The network model
is a disconnected network such as a VDTN at the initial roll-out stages as described in
Chapter 2. The analysed schemes are evaluated for their suitability and applicability in
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such DTN environments. Based on the ﬁndings made from the analysis, novel solutions
are proposed which are expected to improve on the existing schemes. The feasibility
and eﬀectiveness of the proposed schemes is demonstrated using extensive simulations
and compared with some of the very popular works in literature. In addition, stan-
dard metrics for measuring privacy have been used in evaluating the performance of the
schemes.
3.1.1 Motivation for the Analysed Schemes
Generally, location privacy of vehicles may depend on a number of factors which include
vehicle density, the nature/strenght of the attacker and the context in which the vehicles
seeks to achieve privacy [12, 74]. In mix-zones for instance, the number of vehicles willing
to change pseudonyms directly aﬀects the achievable privacy. Although previous work
in [75] studied pseudonym change at small and large mix-zones, the lack of end-to-end
connectivity and low infrastructure[12] at the early roll-out stage poses a challenge to
location privacy and needs further study in order to design solutions suitable for such
scenarios especially at the early stages of deployment.
Since these attributes are similar to that of Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (VDTNs),
it means that contact duration between network entities such as vehicles and road-side
units (RSUs) are short-lived. In addition, security and privacy schemes designed for
conventional VANETs fail to be eﬀective in DTNs. A critical privacy analysis of the
diﬀerent schemes will facilitate the design of privacy techniques for intermittently con-
nected networks. Diﬀerent authors' approaches, and the existence of a myriad of privacy
metrics makes it diﬃcult to have a uniﬁed benchmark. Hence, comparison becomes dif-
ﬁcult as pointed out by [14]. An analysis and comparison of some existing schemes
was performed in order to justify the proposed schemes. Table 3.1 is a summary of the
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Figure 3.1: System Overview of IC-VANET
notations used in this chapter.
3.2 System Description
In this section, a more detailed description of the network model, assumptions and the
attributes of the adversary are presented. Table 3.1 is a summary of the notations used
in this chapter.
3.2.1 Network Model
A network deployment in a rural area representative of the early deployment stage as
shown in Fig. 3.1 is considered similar to the network model described in [76, 28] and
comprises mobile vehicles, RSUs, and a central administrative authority known as the
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Table 3.1: Summary of Notations Used
Notation Description/Functionality
v i vehicle i
λ vehicle arrival rate
Tp Tracking probability
IA Anonymity interval
Zi Density zone i
DZ Set of all density zones
HV Entropy of vehicles
Hmax Maximum entropy
N Total number of vehicle
dA Degree of anonymity
RSU i RSU i
pi Probability of a vehicle being a target
Certi V i's certiﬁcate
Lx V i's location identity
P ir , P
i
b V i's private and public keys
GP ID Group identity
GPPB Group public key
GPPR Group private key
GM ID Group manager's identity
GMPB Group manager's public key
GPPR Group manager's private key
n(v) number of Vi's neighbours
gDoA Group degree of anonymity
α attacker strength
Trusted Key Manager (TKM). Although vehicles are speciﬁcally discussed, it is easy
to apply the conversation to mobile devices with minor modiﬁcations. The RSUs act
as stationary relay nodes that facilitate packet routing in addition to assisting with
the security administration of the TKM. RSUs are only deployed at strategic locations
which are regarded as density zones as in [77]. Note that density and mix-zones are
used interchangeably in this thesis.
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Figure 3.2: Pictorial representation of multi-target tracking showing tracker positions
3.2.2 Attacker Model
The attacker model is depicted in Figure 3.2 above, showing rogue vehicles tracking
passer-by vehicles. The attacker has the ability to listen to beacon messages with
location information around a road junction. Such an attacker is called a multi-target
attacker and it deploys a tracking algorithm, such as correlation tracking [11] to track
its targets based on its knowledge of the network including vehicle mobility and location
updates. The road junction represents a mix-zone. This work assumes a global passive
adversary that can monitor beacon messages exchanged between vehicles to resolve
vehicle and driver identities. The attacker does not actively participate in network
communication. It is assumed that the RSUs are trustworthy and tamper-proof whereas
the vehicles are not, and may deviate in behaviour and act as adversaries that track
other vehicles. The adversary exploits the momentary connection durations to monitor
3.3. Deﬁnitions and Description of Key Terms 52
the pseudonym change process. The eﬀectiveness of the attack may depend on the
strength of the attacker as will be explained later in the proposed scheme. Note that
although Multi-Target Tracking can be beneﬁcial in areas such as satellite tracking
and monitoring, the main idea behind this thesis is that the adversary uses it to its
advantage.
3.3 Deﬁnitions and Description of Key Terms
In this section, some key terms and metrics used in the analysis are deﬁned and described
to facilitate understanding of the topic.
3.3.1 Privacy Analysis
The analysis considered entropy based Shanon's information theory [78] and Poisson
process [11]. It is also considered that location privacy depends on vehicle density [14],
a relationship that is easily understood from pseudonym change - higher vehicle density
means more chances that a vehicle will ﬁnd potential pseudonym collaborators [79].
Since the network is disconnected, the density and mobility pattern of vehicles in the
network and around the density zones will be key to how much privacy is achieved. The
following standard deﬁnitions and terms are discussed: Anonymity, Anonymity Set,
Entropy, and Anonymity Duration. Anonymity duration is a new metric that helps
to quantify the amount of information the attacker can gain for a duration of time as
described in the sections that follow.
Anonymity
The anonymity of a vehicle, vi ∈ V, (where V is the set of all vehicles) can be deﬁned
as a state of being unidentiﬁable among k-1 other vehicles. Anonymity is usually
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related to the notion of unlinkability. Unlinkability is a term used to signify that the
adversary cannot easily link a vehicle's identity, vi to a set of actions, say Actions1 and
Actions2, executed at diﬀerent times t1 and t2, and at diﬀerent respective locations l1
and l2. An example action can be vehicles changing pseudonyms or sending pseudonym
change related messages. This means that a vehicle cannot be linked to its identity
for a duration of time due to its activity on the network. The IEEE 1609.2 standard
supports measuring location privacy using anonymity [80, 24].
Anonymity Set
Anonymity set has been deﬁned in various ways by diﬀerent authors depending on the
context. It can be deﬁned as the average number of vehicles that are indistinguishable
from k-1 other vehicles from the attacker's point of view. It can also be used to represent
the amount of network traﬃc or the volume of network communication in the network.
Naturally, it follows that the larger the AS, the more diﬃcult for the attacker to identify
its target thereby increasing the achievable location privacy. This also means that in
a given vehicle traﬃc situation, heavy vehicle density tends to provide more privacy
due to the number of vehicles participating in communication and possibly, pseudonym
change [81, 14], or even in the volume of messages generated and exchanged by all the
vehicles that comprise the anonymity set. However, it is sometimes not possible to have
the entire vehicle population as the AS especially in disconnected networks.
Tracking Probability
According to [80], the tracking probability, Tp of the PA over a vehicle, vi or a set of
vehicles, is the probability that the anonymity of vehicles in a density zone is equal to
1. The tracking probability, Tp can be derived as follows. Suppose there are DZ = {Z1,
Z2, Z3, ... Zn} density zones, where a vehicle Vi is located in zone Zi during an interval
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of time IA known as the anonymity duration (described later); then the probability of
tracking by the adversary within zone Di can be expressed as:
Tp = Pr(|AS| = 1) (3.1)
The implication in practice from the PA's point of view, is that a vehicle has no
anonymity when the system has |AS| = 1. Similar to [80], the anonymity of the vehicles
within a zone can be calculated by the number of vehicles that meets the |AS| = 1 crite-
rion. Hence, a density zone where 30% of the vehicles have an |AS| = 1 (i.e. Tp = 0.30)
can be said to guarantee an anonymity of 70% (i.e. 1 - Tp = 0.70), which means that
70% of vehicles cannot be tracked. Vehicle tracking is usually based on the assumption
that the identity of a target vehicle is known to the privacy attacker before pseudonym
change. After the pseudonym change, the attacker aims to determine its chances of
a random vehicle being its original target and is treated as a Multi-Target Tracking
(MTT) problem[71, 82]. MTT assumes that beacons are anonymous, the attacker uses
beacons or signals to make observations at scan intervals. The goal of the scan is to ﬁnd
the best estimate of the target's position. For vehicles moving on a highway, the steps
involved can include measuring the position and speed of the target by eavesdropping
on beacon messages. The attacker then calculates a new position based on its previ-
ous estimates of position and speed, and then the new positions are eavesdropped and
matched with the predicted positions.
Entropy and Degree of Anonymity
Entropy is used to measure the degree of uncertainty or disorderliness about a random
variable or event [78]. In the context of location privacy, it is a measure of anonymity
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according to Shanon's information theory which has been widely used in the evaluation
of location privacy for vehicular networks [78]. The uncertainty in the connection rate,
the random mobility and the unpredictable pattern of the system justiﬁes modelling
entropy based on Shanon's equation and as a Poisson process [83] as follows. Note
that the anonymity set does not contain all vehicles in the network because of the
disconnected nature of the network. Hence, the cardinality of anonymity set is not
adequate for measuring the location privacy. Let pi be the probability that vehicle Vi
is targeted by the adversary, then the entropy HV of the AS can be expressed as
HV = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2 pi (3.2)
where N is the total number of observed vehicles.
The entropy can be normalized to have values in the interval (0,1) and is referred to
as the degree of anonymity dA. This makes it possible to compare the entropy value
with the maximum entropy, Hmax of the system which is the uppermost limit of HV as
follows.
Hmax = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2 pi = log2 |N | if ∀i : pi =
1
N
(3.3)
The degree of anonymity, dA is then
dA =
HV
Hmax
(3.4)
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Anonymity Duration
In characterising the anonymity of a system, a new metric called the anonymity du-
ration IA is introduced. It is the time taken by a vehicle Vi to negotiate and change
pseudonyms within a zone, Zi. The PA tries to link the pseudonym identity after
pseudonym change with that before the change. The model is based on the assumption
that on initialization, the PA is able to concretely map all vehicles to their pseudonym
identities. This assumption is necessary since the identity of the vehicle would already
be anonymous on initilisation of the network [74].
Note that the network system is disconnected, hence the vehicle activity around each
mix-zone can be eﬀectively evaluated in isolation. For this reason, it is assumed that
the PA is running some tracking algorithm with which it tries to identify target vehicles
by matching their identities with diﬀerent probability values.
There is an RSU located at every point-of-interest (PoI) location in the simulation
which contains the density zones described earlier. The connection rate is assumed to
follow a Poisson process as in [77, 75, 83]. Let IA be the average time interval within
which the RSU records vehicles connection activities to it. Again, let V be a random
variable which is the number of vehicles that come in contact with RSUi at density zone
Zi during IA, V being the AS. Finally, let the inter-arrival time between connections
have an exponential distribution with a mean value of 1/λ. The anonymity interval is
the time duration within which vehicles try to change pseudonyms. It is also during
this time that the PA monitors vehicles for tracking and possible identiﬁcation. For a
disconnected network, this time is not continuous but can be measured in snapshots of
minutes or hours. Indeed, if T is regarded as the anonymity interval IA deﬁned earlier,
then the probability that Vi is the target vehicle can be expressed as the Poisson process
in (3.5) is
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P (V = Vi|T = IA) = (λIA)
Vi
Vi!
e−λIA (3.5)
The adversary's intention is to identify a target after pseudonym change in the density-
zone within the anonymity duration, IA. However, not all vehicles within a density
zone are target or can successfully change pseudonyms. This can be attributed to such
vehicles not being qualiﬁed enough to be considered pseudonym change candidates by
other vehicles due to poor reputation records. Hence, the expected anonymity set of
vehicles VE is given by
PEx(VE = Vi|T = IA) =
∞∑
i=1
Vi
(λIA)
Vi
Vi!
e−λIA = λIA (3.6)
VE is the average number of vehicles expected to connect and disconnect with the RSU
during IA.
3.4 Simulation and Analysis of Results
This section describes the simulations conducted for the performance evaluation of
the privacy scheme in order to understand their eﬀectiveness. The simulations are
based on the IEEE 802.11p standard on the 75MHz spectrum in the 5.9 GHz band
for ITS. The standards set by the IEEE and SAE namely DSRC/WAVE are meant
to enhance interoperability between devices communicating in this spectrum using two
distinct protocol stacks which features two protocol sets. IPv6/TCP/UDP is used
for V2I communication such as Internet access (e.g. infotainment or Location Based
Services (LBSs)). The WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP) is typically used for
V2V communication such as in safety applications. The rest of this work assumes the
3.4. Simulation and Analysis of Results 58
use of WSMP together with the security protocols deﬁned in IEEE 1609.2 and message
types and formats deﬁned in the SAE J2735 speciﬁcation. The Basic Safety Message
sets deﬁned in SAE J2735 are used to implement privacy protocols.
3.4.1 Simulation Setup
Simulations are carried out in the ONE simulator which has been used extensively to
investigate several application scenarios for VANETs in the area of location privacy
[28, 84]. The choice of the ONE is inspired by the attributes of the system namely
delay tolerance, lack of end-to-end connectivity and the popularity of the simulator.
The various simulation runs use between 30 to 400 vehicles and RSUs as shown in Fig.
3.3. The vehicles move on the map of the City of Helsinki which is the default map
in the ONE simulator measuring 4500 x 3400 m2. The RSUs are placed at chosen
intersections which represent centres of the density zones. Table 3.2 is summary of our
key simulation parameters. Simulations settings for each experiment is mentioned and
discussed where neccessary.
In order to comply with Finnish traﬃc regulations, all vehicles in the experiment are
set to drive at the average lower and upper speed bounds of between 30 to 60 kmh−1.
Note that, although the vehicles drive at the same speed of 30 − 60kmh−1, they do
not arrive at the same time since not all the vehicles begin their journeys at the same
time. This is also why the attacker can isolate a section of the network for an attack.
Since vehicles usually follow deﬁned routes in the form of roads, it is assumed that the
vehicles use the shortest path map-based movement mobility model where vehicles are
ﬁrst situated randomly on diﬀerent spots on the road and then allowed to travel along
predeﬁned routes to their destinations.
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Figure 3.3: Snapshot of the Helsinki City map
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Table 3.2: Simulation Settings
Simulation Parameter Settings/Description
Sim duration Varying simulation time
Number of vehicles and RSUs 30 - 400 vehicles; 7 RSUs
Vehicle speed 30 - 60 kmh−1
Transmission coverage 100 m
Mobility model Shortest path map based move-
ment
Packet size 500k  1M
Message generation interval 25 s  35s
3.4.2 Group Communication for Privacy in Disconnected VANETs
This section describes location privacy using the group communication technique. Low
vehicle density in VANETs usually results in a low level of privacy among the communi-
cating peers. One possible solution that has been widely explored is the use of mix-zones
in conjunction with group communication [85][65]. This is based on the preservation of
privacy using commonalities of interest among vehicles. For instance, vehicles that often
meet at a parking garage will most likely cooperate as groups to avoid being tracked.
Such vehicles share the same credentials as a group including public and private keys for
signing messages. Group communication has become one of the most discussed means
of achieving eﬀective privacy and packet routing in ad hoc networks including VDTNs.
However, most existing privacy schemes lack ﬂexibility in the dynamics of group for-
mation and the level of privacy achievable. Again, it is diﬃcult to evaluate privacy for
sparse VDTNs for rural area and early stages of deployment. A model for calculating
the privacy achieved with respect to the attacker strength, anonymity duration and the
vehicle density is explored here.
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Group Composition
New groups can be formed in a number of ways. For example, groups can be formed
by vehicles in the same geographical location. Such a geographical location can be
deﬁned by the nearby RSU using GPS signals. Groups can also be formed by vehicles
with similar attributes (e.g. group of public buses owned by a particular transport
company). However, in a disconnected network, the group formation process is more
critical especially when new members decide to join. The details of the group formation
process is discussed. It is assumed that groups are formed based on location; location-
based groups are known to be more useful for safety critical applications as in [86][87].
On initialization, the following assumptions as obtained in several proposed schemes on
security and privacy in DTNs[88][75][89] are made; there exist the bilinear parameters
[87], {Q,G,GT , eˆ, P}. Both G and GT are cyclic additive and multiplicative groups
respectively, and have the same prime order q. The mapping between G and GT , eˆ : G
× G =⇒ GT is regarded as a bilinear map on the following conditions:
• Bilinear: ∀P, Q, R ∈ G and ∀a, b ∈ Z, eˆ(Q, P+R) = eˆ(P+R, Q) = eˆ(P, Q) .
(R, Q). Again, eˆ(aP, bP) = eˆ(P, bP )a = eˆ(aP, P )b = eˆ(P, P )ab.
• Non-degenerate: There exists (P, Q) ∈ G such that eˆ(P, Q) 6= 1GT .
• Computable: There exists an eﬃcient algorithm to compute eˆ(P, Q) for any (P,
Q) ∈ G.
The bilinear map eˆ can be constructed on elliptic curves. Each operation for computing
is a pairing operation. Pairing operation is the most expensive operation in this kind of
cryptographic scheme. The fewer the number of pairing operations, the more eﬃcient
the scheme is. The groups G and GT are called bilinear groups. The security of our
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schemes relies on the fact that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on bilinear groups
is computationally hard, i.e., given the point P = aQ, there exists no eﬃcient algorithm
to obtain a given P and Q. The implication is that Q can be transferred in an open
wireless channel without worrying that a (usually some secret) can be known by the
attackers.
The TKM chooses a random number, r ∈ Z∗q . It also computes a public key as Pk =
rP ∈ G and publishes the parameters q,G,GT , e, P, Pk. Each vehicle is equipped with
credentials for signing messages as follows: The TKM selects a random number rv ∈ Z∗q
as the private key P ir of vehicle Vi and computes the public key, P
i
b as rvP . The TKM
issues the certiﬁcate CertVi as CertVi = Sgn(s, P
i
b ) and securely delivers P
i
r and CertVi
to Vi through some delay tolerant routing protocol.
In addition to assigning credentials to vehicles, the TKM also assigns credentials to
the RSUs in the following manner - the RSU issues group credentials on the ﬂy to the
vehicles to facilitate group communication. Each RSU is equipped with a certiﬁcate
for signing messages as follows: The TKM selects a random number ru ∈ Z∗q as the
private key P ur of RSU, RSUi and computes the public key, P
u
b as ruP . The TKM also
generates a signature SgnU as Sgn(r, Pk||Lx) where Lx is the unique location identiﬁer
representing the GPS coordinates of the stationary RSU. Finally, the TKM issues the
certiﬁcate CertUi as CertUi = Sgn(s, P
u
b ||Lx), and securely delivers P ur and CertUi to
Ui through some persistent wired connection.
The RSUs coordinate groups within their transmission range since they are reliable and
computationally powerful. A group is characterised by an identity GPID, a public key,
GPPB and a private key, GPPR. Each group is under the administration of a group
manager, GMID, that possesses a public and private key pair, GMPB and GMPR with
which to interact with the TKM and vehicles. To facilitate one-to-one communication
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where vehicles can send unicast messages to other vehicles, vehicles can use their cre-
dentials as described above for signing direct messages. This means that a vehicle can
send messages to a group or directly to an individual of interest. Vehicles can establish
an opportunistic connection to the TKM via RSUs for updating their credentials such
as pseudonyms and reporting misbehaviour (this is discussed in Chapter 5).
Group Join/Leave
Although scenarios where a vehicle leaves a group are not considered in the thesis, no
action needs to be taken in such situations. However, the formation of cooperative
groups, more than providing anonymity also ensures reduction in communication over-
heads during signalling messages exchanged due to security protocols. When a vehicle
leaves a group, the anonymity set size obviously reduces. Although the group becomes
easier to manage, it also enhances the tracking accuracy of the adversary and endangers
vehicle privacy.
3.4.3 Attacker Model for Group Communication
Generally, a global attacker operates in such a way that it can monitor communication
and have a wide scope of coverage that enables it to launch tracking attacks on any
parts of the network. However, it has diﬃculty launching such an attack because of
the disconnectedness of the network. A local attacker on the other hand can act as
an internal or external adversary with the capacity to monitor interactions between
groups exchanging messages. Internal attackers can also be in the form of dishonest
group members that compromise information between two or more members of a group
or diﬀerent groups with the intention to reduce the vehicular density, and hence the
anonymity set. Another type of attack, which is an extension of the dishonest group
member attack is when a member compromises many vehicles further degrading the
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secrecy and privacy of the entire group i.e. reduces the anonymity set size, thereby
making it easier for the adversary to guess the target within the shortest anonymity
duration possible.
3.4.4 Measuring the Anonymity Based on Attacker Strength
It is to be noted that no perfect attacker exists in reality. Let's say a vehicle have
equal probability to be identiﬁed with an action with IDs IDi and ID
′
i and that two
vehicles are likely to be related to V, the AS = [50%, 50%], hence the entropy = 1.
However, using attacker strength as a measure of tracking probability(anonymity), it
is assumed that a vehicle is likely to have identity IDi with probability 75% assigned
by the attacker; the anonymity set becomes [75%, 25%], hence the entropy is 0.81.
Furthermore, assuming 4 vehicles with each equally likely to be the target, the AS =
[25%, 25%,25%, 25%], hence the entropy is 2. The above analysis suggests that the
level of privacy available to a target vehicle depends on the strength of an attacker here
measured in probabilities [74]. This means that higher entropy values means that an
attacker has more diﬃculty tracking its target.
Measuring the Anonymity for a Group
To evaluate the anonymity for a group, the scheme in [74] is adopted to model the ability
of the attacker as shown in (3.7) below, where pa represents the tracking probability
of an attacker tracking a driver's vehicle v. n(v) represents the number of neighbours
and α represents the attacker strength. Note that n is not isolated/separate and is
written together as n(v). The attacker strength is measured by assigning probabilities
that reﬂect its computation power and strength. A practical signiﬁcance of the attacker
strength is the measure of messages/information it can process during the anonymity
duration to facilitate tracking of a target. It can also mean the more powerful attacker
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have a better ability to track their targets.
pa =
α
α+ (n(v)(1− α)) (3.7)
Group degree of anonymity was ﬁrst proposed by [65] as an extension of the work by Diaz
[90]. Our modiﬁed group anonymity scheme also takes into account the group density,
the anonymity duration and the attacker strength. Note that the group anonymity
is representative of the collective privacy enjoyed by a particular group, the physical
signiﬁcance of which is that a vehicle will most likely want to associate with a group
with higher privacy instead of a low privacy group.
Model Validation and Discussion
A group of 10 to 200 was used to demonstrate the results and calculate to what degree
an attacker of varying strengths is able to identify its targets. The attacker strength, α
is varied from 0.1 to 0.95. Note that attacker strength of 1 assumes the attacker is 100%
accurate, which is not possible in reality. The ﬁgure also present results for anonymity
duration of 20 seconds to quantify how much information is leaked out of the system
based on the time available to the attacker. To account for the anonymity duration of
20 seconds, 3.7 was multiplied by 20 and the resulting values for the GDoA normalized
to obtain the values plotted in Fig. 3.4. For the value of the GDoA corresponding to
attacker strength of 0.95 and the number of vehicles equal to 10, it has been set to 0.95
for the reason that the value of 1 is not ideal.
As shown in Fig. 3.4, the dependency of the achievable group privacy on the group
density, the anonymity duration, and the strength of the attacker is demonstrated. It
shows that with a group density of fewer than 20 vehicles, the adversary has a reasonable
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advantage over the vehicles. However, beyond 20 vehicles, each group enjoys reasonable
privacy with the anonymity approaching zero for densities up to 200 vehicles. The
anonymity duration is calculated based on a 20 seconds attack window representing the
anonymity duration. The longer the anonymity duration, the more chances the attacker
will be able to work out its target. However, the network naturally does not allow such
considerable length of time for vehicles to interact with one another, a phenomenon
that naturally discourages the privacy attacker.
Figure 3.4: Average GDoA vs. Group density with 0.1 - 0.95 attacker strengths
3.4.5 Silent Period Pseudonym Changing Scheme for DTN
Here, the privacy problem is treated and evaluated as a Multi-Target Tracking problem
[11]. The MTT approach comprises a set of algorithms that are used in a variety
of applications such as aircraft tracking, satellite tracking, military surveillance, and
visual tracking. The tracking approach periodically measures observations, also known
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as scans by sensors with the goal of ﬁnding the best estimate of a target's position in each
scan. However, it is often diﬃcult to generate the correct associations in the presence
of noise and errors that arise when measuring the position of moving objects. The
discussions and simulations made here do not account for these errors. The evaluation
is based on the Silent period method proposed by [11]. Silent period combines group
communication with the random silent period PET to mitigate vehicle tracking by
an adversary. During the silent period, the idea is for vehicles to temporarily suspend
sending beacons or broadcast. The temporary time can be used in changing pseudonyms
to evade tracking by a MTT tracker, after which beacon communication may resume.
In measuring the performance of an attacker deploying the algorithm, a variety of
metrics can be used to measure the privacy enjoyed by a vehicle which include entropy
and maximum tracking time. The latter metric is used here - the maximum tracking
time Ttrack, of a target is the maximum cumulative time the target's anonymity set size
remains as one. It assumed that the vehicle are uniformly distributed with density ρ.
According to [11], while uniform distribution fails to account for the restrictions due to
the street layout, it is adequate for estimating the number of vehicle travelling across
zones or regions since the map layout is not symmetric and densities and velocities
are properly related. As stated earlier and according the baseline scheme, the number
of vehicle in a zone is modelled as a spatial Poisson process [11, 75] as follows. If
the number of vehicles in area A is by v(A), the process is distributed according to
[11, 91]: Pr{v(A) = i} = (ρA)ii! e−ρA. The tracking technique is used to study how a
global passive attacker tracks vehicles during diﬀerent random silent periods. The global
passive tracker overhears broadcasts from its targets using the MTT technique.The
tracking technique works as follows. The attacker determines last know details of the
target vehicle such as location, speed and direction at a particular time. Based on the
possible directions the target can turn, it makes a new estimate around the location
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where its actual position at a later time based on silent periods (the duration between
each broadcast is taken to be the silent period). The attacker repeats the scans until
the expiry of each silent period. If there is at least one target in the estimated area
Ar, the probability of uniquely identifying the target at each transmission, denoted by
ptrack [11], is:
ptrack = Pr{v(Ar) = 1|v(Ar) ≥ 1} = Pr{v(Ar) = 1}
1− Pr{v(Ar) = 0} =
ρAre
(−ρAr)
1− e−ρAr (3.8)
The expected maximum tracking time then becomes:
E{Ttrack} =
∞∑
i=1
ipi−1track(1 − ptrack)E{speriod} =
E{speriod}
1− ptrack (3.9)
where E{speriod} is the maximum silent duration.
3.4.6 Analysis of Target Tracking
Figure 3.5 considers a highway scenario under three silent periods corresponding to
pseudonym change intervals in the presence of a privacy attacker. The density of vehicles
varied from 50 to 400. Three scenarios are considered corresponding to three silent
periods - no pseudonym change (i.e. no silent period is set), and silent periods of 50
and 100 seconds. The choice of the silent periods reﬂects the reality of DTNs where
connections cannot be sustained for long durations for the attacker to track vehicles for
long durations. In the scenario where no pseudonym changes is considered, the results
show that the adversary uses its deployed tracking algorithm to track every vehicle with
no vehicle excluded. The next two experiments use pseudonym validity/changing times
of 50 seconds and 100 seconds respectively. When the pseudonym validity time was
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50 seconds, the adversary was not able to track more than 50 per cent of the vehicles.
In other words, this means that since the silent period is only 50 seconds and vehicles
switch on their antenna every other 50 seconds when the silent period expires, 50% of
vehicles that can be tracked is only tracked 50% of the time.
However, it is observed that when the pseudonym validity time was changed to 100
seconds the pseudonym tracking probability was still high. The ﬁgure also show the
correlation between tracking and the number of vehicles and the level of activity(the
volume of vehicle to vehicle interactions) within the network. This means that as the
density of vehicles increases from 50 to 400, it is less likely that vehicles can be tracked.
Figure 3.5: Evaluation of vehicle tracking for diﬀerent silent periods. Pn which is called
pseudonym validity times also represents the silent periods
3.4.7 Comparison of MOP, Cachecloak, Mix-Zone, and k-Anonymity
In the Mutually Obfuscating Paths (MOP) method [73], vehicles use artiﬁcially gen-
erated path and location updates that appear to diverge from the real paths. The
artiﬁcially generated paths are faked in a way that they appear to be real and believ-
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able. From the adversary point of view, the vehicle's path will appear to diverge from
the actual path. The paths thus created are used to facilitate the obfuscation that helps
to confuse the privacy attacker. MOP provides strong privacy protection under frequent
location updates in sparse road traﬃc conditions. How and when is MOP initiated and
performed by two vehicles depends on the context. When vehicles vi and vj exchange
beacons, based on the context of the beacons containing location, speed, and direction
details, vi checks if its real path and vj 's fake path can converge within a time, Tc as
follows:
Tc >
Dist(locjcur → locicur+Tc)
speedjcur(1 + γ)
, (3.10)
where locjcur + Tc is the new estimated position, Dist(loc
j
cur → locicur + Tc) is the dis-
tance from the starting point of vj 's fake path to the farthest converging point (loc
i
cur +
Tc) and γ is the predeﬁned margin regarded as the boundary of the mix-zone. When
vi ﬁnds the farthest convergent spot that satisﬁes equation 3.6 by replacing Tc and Tm,
it then selects Test−conv randomly between Tm and Tc for the convergent position Lconv
(= locicur + T est−conv) ahead of time. This implies that vehicle i will get to Lconv if
tracking along its path with constant speed and j fake location at Lconv if travelling at
its default speed for Test−conv in the following manner:
speedBdft =
Dist(locjcur → locicur + Test−conv)
Test−conv
(3.11)
where speedjdft is within the margin of γ of it's original speed speed
B
cur. As soon as the
fake and real paths meet, i sends the real location to the LBS while performing MOP
with others as it travels. MOP provides location privacy when vehicles generate fake
paths for each other. However, a selﬁsh vehicle may not follow this cooperative approach
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and refuse to generate fake paths for others. However, such vehicles are left unprotected
since MOP guarantees privacy when users are in a mutually beneﬁcial relationship.
Cachecloak enables real-time anonymisation of location data where the anonymising
server generates locations predictions from historic mobility data and submits inter-
sections of the predicated paths simultaneously to the LBS. New predicted paths are
made to intersect with users, and ensures that no user path can be reliably tracked over
time. It uses path confusion and queries are answered with no degradation in accuracy.
Mobility prediction is used to predict that users will eventually go through an intersec-
tion of interest. It obviates the need to sacriﬁce availability or accuracy at any point.
However, it does not anonymize user details and not realistic in DTNs. Cachecloak uses
ﬁrst order Markov model in which the probability that a user will exit side j given an
entry point i is:
P (j|i) = cij∑
i=1 cij
(3.12)
where cij represents the number of times a vehicle has entered from an entry point i
and exited through an exit point j. The probability that a user will exit side j without
any knowledge of the entry side is given by:
P (j) =
∑
i=1 cij∑
i=1
∑
i=1 cij
(3.13)
The disadvantage of using the Cachecloak privacy technique in DTN environments is
that it makes use of historic data which is not ideal for use in communicating sensitive
information such as safety messages.
In k-Anonymity scheme, the idea is to provide a form of some level of reasonable de-
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niablity by ensuring that a user cannot be individually identiﬁed from a group of k-1
users. It is achieved by choosing a suﬃciently large k-anonymous group/region that
encloses k users in space and time instead of reporting a single location coordinate (e.g.
GPS coordinate). It functions by forming a region around many users. Unfortunately,
this can lead to spatial inaccuracy especially when a user location really need to be
resolved to a singular location as accurately as possible e.g. during search and rescue
in emergencies.
3.4.8 Evaluation of MOP, Cachecloak, Mix-Zone, and k-Anonymity
The diﬀerent privacy schemes namely MOP, Cachecloak, Mix-Zone, and k-Anonymity
have been evaluated as shown in Figure 3.6 and 3.7. The simulation measured the
entropy guaranteed by the diﬀerent techniques using a vehicle density of 400 for varying
times of 0 to 10 minutes on a highway scenario. As seen in Figure 3.6, although the other
schemes show a high entropy apart from the mix-zone scheme which is the lowest, the
other schemes are not suitable for disconnected networks. For instance, MOP depends
on an intermediate system in the form of an LBS which can introduce some unnecessary
delay in an already disconnected network. Cachecloak fails to meet the requirements
for providing location privacy since it makes use of historic data. Note that the network
considered already lack end to end connectivity and is expected to handle sensitive
communication such as safety messages. Hence, historic data is not suitable as vehicle
will have to wait to build such records over time leading to long delays.
In Figure 3.7, the entropy achieved using the MOP technique is analysed o further
demonstrate the impact of varying the number of vehicles (which aﬀects the level of
activity) on the entropy. The MOP technique is chosen as a representative example
in this analysis but it is possible to use other techniques. In this experiment, vehicle
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Figure 3.6: Evaluation of vehicle tracking for diﬀerent PETs
densities of 60, 120 and 180 were used similar to the scheme in [73] to measure the
entropy of the MOP scheme. As seen in the ﬁgure, the entropy achieved with 180
vehicles suggests that more vehicles have better chances of forming obfuscating paths
compared to a lesser number of vehicle density of 60. It shows that even for the least
number of vehicles which is 60, although the attacker is relatively more successful in
tracking a target, the MOP technique is able to form enough obfuscating paths to
guarantee user privacy.
3.4.9 Summary of Main Contributions
The contributions made in this chapter can be summarised as follows:
• A target tracking scheme is developed which is used to simulate the diﬀerent
schemes analysed using a detailed study of the network and mobility dynamics.
• A comprehensive analysis of location privacy in a disconnected network using an
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Figure 3.7: Evaluation of MOP for diﬀerent vehicle densities
adapted version of the popular MTT algorithm where the adversary uses position
estimates to track a target is employed.
• The relationship between vehicle density, attacker strength, the nature of the
attacker and the anonymity is highlighted. Through extensive simulations, the
pros and cons of the evaluated schemes are demonstrated.
• Some well-established PETs referenced in standards documents and literature have
been referenced and compared to support the ﬁndings and criticisms made in this
thesis.
Lastly in this chapter, various PET schemes namely mix-zone, MOP, group communica-
tion, silent period, k-anonymity and Cachecloak has been analysed. The MTT tracking
algorithm was used to develop a global adversary model that tracks vehicles. The an-
alytical model is supported and validated by simulation results and takes into account
the disconnected nature of the network. It is established that while most of the schemes
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considered achieved a high entropy, the mix-zone scheme is the best suited for deploy-
ment in DTN environments. Based on the observations in the analysis above, a novel
location privacy solution suited for disconnected network environments is proposed. For
the group communication scheme, the analysis takes into account the attacker strength
ranging from 0.1 to 0.95 and the anonymity duration of 20 seconds to measure how
much privacy vehicles enjoy. The results show that even for the strongest attacker with
a strength of 0.95, the privacy enjoyed by vehicles is high in comparison to the attacker
strength. This observation holds even for small vehicle densities. In the next chapter,
the thesis investigates how location privacy can be achieved using on-the-ﬂy mix zones
in the presence of selﬁsh vehicles.
Chapter 4
Privacy-Preserving Scheme for
VANETs Based On Dynamic
Mix-Zones (PriSerV)
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the ineﬃciency of traditional mix-zones to guarantee location privacy
in disconnected VANETs is highlighted. The contribution made in this section includes
a Privacy-preSerVing (PriSerV) and a dynamic On-the-Fly Mix-zone Scheme (OFMS)
scheme. The scheme is validated using multidimensional trust scheme based on Jaccard
Similarity Index (JSI). The JSI concept will be described in detail much later. Details
of the contributions in line with the set objectives to achieve LP through the dynamic
OFMS is discussed. The thesis also describes the proposed OFMS scheme based on
a simple game theory scheme for enhancing pseudonym change. The game scheme
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forms the basis for encouraging reluctant and selﬁsh vehicles to change pseudonyms.
The strengths of the proposed scheme, its advantages and limitations compared with
previous schemes is also discussed.
4.2 Motivation for the Proposed PriSerV Scheme
Most pseudonym-based PETs such as the conventional mix-zone technology rely on
the vehicular density as well as the number of vehicles willing to cooperate to change
pseudonyms at the time of pseudonym change negotiation. For this reason, such schemes
make it diﬃcult for vehicles to attain and maintain a satisfactory level of privacy in the
presence of a PA especially in Sparse Vehicle Density (SVD) conditions where there
are not enough vehicles to cooperate and change pseudonyms. Generally, it is easier
for a vehicle to ﬁnd Pseudonym Change Collaborators (PCCs) in High Vehicle Density
(HVD) scenarios than in SVD conditions. An example of an SVD scenario is the early
stages of ITS deployment.
Again, traditional mix-zone locations are ﬁxed and cannot be changed on the ﬂy. This
implies that there is a strict pseudonym change schedule even when some vehicles have
no need to change pseudonyms. The implication of this is that vehicles have no con-
trol over their LP preferences. Such a strict schedule even aﬀords the PA an advan-
tage regarding the predictability of timed pseudonym attacks since the mix-zone and
pseudonym change process is predictable based on time and location. The recent work
proposed investiagted the the optimal placement of mix-zones and RSUs [92, 93]. The
authors propose a novel metric based on the mobility proﬁles of mobile nodes in order
to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of possible mix-zone locations. However, their proposed
approach is not an eﬃcient solution for disconnected VANETs [12].
Finally, depending on the rate of vehicle entry and exit from the mix-zone, an adversary
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can easily track its target by correlating the entry and exit sequence using a Multi-Target
Tracking (MTT) technique. If the entry and exit pattern are statistically uncorrelated,
the adversary may ﬁnd it computationally harder to guess the target vehicles during
and after the pseudonym change.
The Behaviour of Selﬁsh Vehicles
The presence of selﬁsh vehicles undermines the eﬀorts of other vehicles seeking to change
pseudonyms. Such vehicles may be reluctant to cooperate to change pseudonym in
order to conserve scarce network resources such as bandwidth and energy. This means
that irrespective of the vehicular density (SVD or HVD) in a mix-zone context, some
vehicle still experience diﬃculties in ﬁnding pseudonym change partners, especially in
a sparse network, thereby leaving unselﬁsh vehicles more vulnerable to being tracked
[12]. Motivated by these observations, the thesis proposes PriSerV to address achieving
LP using an intermittently connected VANET (IC-VANET) architecture. The proposed
scheme enables vehicles to form on-the-ﬂy mix-zones that adapt to the disconnectedness
of the network in order to achieve a reasonable level of privacy in an eﬃcient and
dynamic manner. This is achieved through a game theory based location-aware scheme
where vehicles determine the best conditions for negotiating and changing pseudonyms.
4.3 Main Contributions of PriSerV
The key contributions made in this chapter are as follows:
• The thesis proposed the PriSerV scheme for IC-VANETs that enables a vehicle to
attain its desired level of privacy even in low-density traﬃc situations by establish-
ing an on-the-ﬂy mix-zone. Diﬀerent from most existing schemes, the proposed
solution is without the intervention of the RSU infrastructure thereby avoiding
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the communication overhead that otherwise would be incurred in communicating
with the RSU. Therefore, it is suitable for scenarios where conventionally ﬁxed
mix-zones fail or are ineﬀective.
• Secondly, due to the selﬁshness of some vehicles, a simple and static game theoretic
model is proposed to coerce selﬁsh vehicles to change pseudonyms. The game
scheme ensures that non-cooperative selﬁsh vehicles are persuaded to negotiate
and eventually change pseudonyms.
• Through simulations in the ONE simulator, the feasibility of the proposed scheme
is demonstrated and the results compared to the existing scheme.
4.4 Model Description
The network model is similar to that in Chapter 3 where the network lacked end-to-
end connectivity. However, RSUs do not play a role in the mix-zone formation here.
A diﬀerent variety of attacker behaviour (selﬁsh vehicles as described in the previous
section) in addition to a global passive and global active attacker is considered. An
attacker having selﬁsh intentions means that it refuses to change pseudonyms when it
knows that by refusing to change pseudonyms, it saves resources such as energy. In
contrast to a selﬁsh attacker, a malicious attacker which is not considered here has
the intention to disrupt network activity such as dropping packets or launching DoS
attacks. Speciﬁcally, such vehicles may negotiate but refuse to cooperate with other
well-behaved vehicles in order to undermine their eﬀorts towards achieving privacy.
4.5 Details of the Proposed PriSerV Scheme
The motivation for PriSerV arises from the ineﬃciency and rigidity of traditionally
ﬁxed mix-zones especially in the presence of selﬁsh vehicles in challenged VANETs,
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especially at early stage deployment. It is assumed that vehicles form mix zones, MZ
= {Z1, Z2, Z3, ... Zn} as in the previous chapter on the ﬂy, where any vehicle in need
of pseudonym change can trigger pseudonym change by invoking the OFMS protocol
(described in detail later).
Unlike the ﬁxed mix-zones discussed in Chapter 3, the mix-zones considered here are
negotiated on the ﬂy and can be initiated by any vehicle in need of pseudonym change.
In conventional mix-zones, pseudonym change can occur at any of the predetermined lo-
cations where a vehicle deems ﬁt as long as there is an adequate number of collaborators
with matching attributes. Matching attributes for pseudonym change typically include
location, speed, trust level, the frequency of contact, and direction of travel. It may
also include attributes such as the reputation of the vehicles involved. For instance, the
authors in [94] propose a pseudonym-based privacy scheme where the reputation of a
vehicle is used as the basis to determine its suitability as a pseudonym change partner.
In the light of this, neither HVD nor SVD scenarios are ideal for pseudonym change
since they leave the PA with an easy guess of its target [12]. In the previous chapter,
the ease with which the adversary can track its target out of a number of vehicles is
established, with the probability decreasing as the vehicle population increases.
4.5.1 Pseudonym Change Model and Mix-Zone Formation
The motivation for the proposed scheme is derived from [79]. However, diﬀerent from
[79], vehicles are able to form mix-zones on the ﬂy without the intervention of the RSU.
The advantage of not having the RSU is because the back-and-forth communication to
the RSU leads to an added overhead in terms of bandwidth usage and delay especially in
an unpredictable and disconnected network infrastructure. For a better understanding,
some preliminaries are explained namely the OFMS and Game Theory Scheme for
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Figure 4.1: Summary of Pseudonym Change Process
Privacy (GTSP).
The details of the OFMS is shown in Algorithm 4.1. When a vehicle Vi intends to
improve its location privacy level by changing its current pseudonym, it invokes the
OFMS algorithm by sending a Pseudonym Change Request (PCR) as a broadcast mes-
sage seeking collaborators to agree to form a mix-zone. The PCR contains Vi's location,
time-stamp, the speed of travel, the direction of travel, as well as its current reputation
score. When it receives a PCR response from a target vehicle Vj , it will ideally expect
vehicles with similar characteristics to agree to change pseudonyms. An example sce-
nario based on the reputation score and privacy level as the determinant factors for the
mix-zone establishment and pseudonym change.
Three types of vehicles: a well-behaved vehicle, Vi that initiates the PCR, a well-behaved
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Table 4.1: Summary of Notations Used
Notation Description/Functionality
Vi, Vi and Vs Vehicles i j and s
Rt Reputation score of a vehicle at time t
Rth Reputation threshold of a vehicle
Rmax Maximum reputation threshold of a vehicle
Lp Location privacy strength of vehicle at time t
Lmax Maximum location privacy strength of vehicle at time t
L Vehicle location
X Pool of X pseudonyms
X' Pool of X' pseudonyms
x A speciﬁc pseudonym from the pool of X pseudonyms
x' A speciﬁc pseudonym from the pool of X' pseudonyms
recipient vehicle, Vj that receives the PCR and is willing to change pseudonyms, and
Vs, a selﬁsh vehicle that is being coerced to change pseudonyms. The vehicles do not
need to ﬁrst send a PCR to an RSU since its presence all the time is not guaranteed
especially during the early stages of ITS deployment with limited infrastructure. There
are several reasons why a mobile device or vehicle may decide to be selﬁsh. These
include energy saving, bandwidth utilisation and resource/transmission cost. Although
the need to save energy may not be obvious for a vehicle with a 12 volts battery,
the vehicle can still be selﬁsh especially in order to avoid the communication cost of
exchanging pseudonym negotiation messages which takes time to accomplish [95].
4.5.2 Deﬁnitions of Symbols
The following notations are deﬁned (see Fig. 4.1 and Table 4.1); Rt is the reputation
value of a vehicle accumulated up till time, t of the PCR (Rt > 0). Rth is the reputation
threshold at which vehicles are more likely to honour PCRs from others i.e. vehicles with
reputation values less than the threshold are less likely to ﬁnd pseudonym partners. It
is assumed that vehicles have a reputation threshold of 0.5 when they join the network.
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Rmax is the maximum reputation score any vehicle can have where 0 < Rt < Rth <
Rmax. Simply put, a vehicle reputation is a perception of such vehicle by another
vehicle or network entity that determines the ease at which another vehicle is willing to
exchange or forward to it.
Let Lp be the location privacy strength of Vi at time t and that a vehicle can attain a
maximum strength of location privacy of Lmax. All vehicles aim to attain the maximum
level of privacy when they change pseudonyms. However, such an ideal condition does
not exist. A vehicle that attains the maximum value may have no need for pseudonym
change. In addition, depending on the number of replies, the total number of vehicles
that cooperates to pseudonym change may or may not lead to the desired privacy level
needed.
It is possible for vehicles to receive multiple requests at a time. A vehicle has two possible
options in such situations: it can use the signal strength or the calculated distance
separating it from the requester to determine which vehicle to change pseudonyms with.
Note that a vehicle can speciﬁcally set the number of cooperating vehicles it requires
depending on the level of privacy it desires. This makes it possible for a vehicle to
adjust its privacy needs based on its requirements and still be able to achieve privacy
levels close to Lmax.
Operational Detail of the OFMS
When Vj receives a PCR request from Vi, it ﬁrst checks its distance from Vi or the
signal strength of the requesting vehicles. This is done in case it almost simultaneously
receives requests from other vehicles to determine which is closer and be able to verify
similarity in separating distance and direction of travel. Secondly, it checks if its Rt <
Rth, if Rt < Rth, it may accept the PCR challenge, else, it refuses pseudonym change.
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This is because it has no need for privacy protection and would rather save on resources
than exert itself in pseudonym negotiation. On the other hand, if the Lp < Lmax, it
will likely change the pseudonym too, else it will decline the request. When the vehicle
turns down the pseudonym request, such a vehicle is regarded as a selﬁsh vehicle, Vs.
A vehicle can have a ﬁne-grained control over its privacy requirements in that the
initiator of the PCR can also change its mind after it receives PCR ACKs. After a
vehicle receives a PCR ACK request from potential collaborators, it reserves the right
to back down from changing pseudonyms for some reasons. For example, if it does not
get its desired number of collaborators. In that case, it will send another PCR request
after an interval equal to 4t in the hope that more vehicles will have arrived around its
new location. This also ensures that the PCR initiator is able to adjust its requirements
based on the vehicle density at each point in time.
4.5.3 Pseudonym Change and the Privacy Attacker
This section describes the PA's goal and the behaviour of the vehicles, Vj and Vs. The
PA monitors a vehicle until it enters and emerges from the mix-zone. Assuming N
vehicles enter a mix-zone, and all vehicles are equipped with a pool of X pseudonyms
before entry, the vehicles emerge from the mix-zone with a pool of X' after changing
their initial pseudonyms during the duration of the mix-zone. The PA will compare X
with X' set of pseudonyms after the pseudonym change. The probability that the PA
successfully links a speciﬁc pseudonym, x ∈ X to another pseudonym, x' ∈ X' is pixx′
for a vehicle, Vi monitored by PA after it emerges from the mix-zone during a duration
equal to the anonymity duration. According to the equation of anonymity which depicts
the PA's degree of uncertainty, the strength of the location privacy after the pseudonym
change session is
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Hvi = −
N∑
i=1
pixx
′ log2 pixx
′ (4.1)
Game Theory for Pseudonym Change
For a selﬁsh uncooperative vehicle Vs that receives the PCR from Vi, it will choose to
turn down the PCR. By turning down the PCR request, it undermines the eﬀorts of Vi
and other cooperating vehicles to change pseudonyms, even when Vi's reputation value
and location privacy level is high enough to persuade Vs to change pseudonyms. The
simple game theoretic scheme describes how Vs can be coerced to cooperate. When it
refuses, it can be tracked with a probability equal to 1 by the PA as it lacks privacy by
not changing pseudonyms (assuming that only the selﬁsh vehicle refuses to cooperate).
Note that the reputation of a vehicle cannot determine if a vehicle will be selﬁsh or not.
The pseudonym game PCgame is represented as a simple static game in that the game
is contained within a mix-zone with vehicles only interacting within a limited area with
no external inﬂuence from the wider environment. Let PCgame = (P, S, U) where P =
set of players(vehicles), S = set of strategies, and U = set of pay-oﬀ. Note that multiple
games can be simultaneously played at a time. However, a player can only participate
in one game at a time. There are two possible strategies a vehicle can exploit: cooperate
to change pseudonym or turn down the pseudonym request.
According to [96] where the author models the pseudonym change decisions of mobile
nodes in a mix-zone, the pay-oﬀ for a player can either be privacy gain or loss and the
cost of changing pseudonyms. Note that non-cooperation also comes at a cost. The
payoﬀ can be written as V ui = V
b
i − V ci where V bi is dependent on the strength of the
location privacy of the vehicle at time t, and V ci is a cost that depends on the loss
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of privacy and the cost of changing pseudonyms at time, t. If two vehicles engage in
pseudonym change, they both beneﬁt from the pseudonym change by paying the cost
of one pseudonym change. Otherwise, a single vehicle changing pseudonym pays the
total cost and suﬀers a degradation in location privacy as well. Although updates can
be done repetitively to ensure more accurate results at every point in time, this thesis
assumes a simple single scheme. However, that is made up for by running the simulation
multiple times to ensure the accuracy of the average results obtained.
Clearly, Vs's rating and privacy level will increase if it cooperates since the number of
cooperating vehicles aﬀects the level of privacy achievable and depends on the density
of vehicles in the mix-zone. Assuming that all vehicles that receive the PCR cooperates,
both Vs and Vi will attain the highest privacy level and increase their reputation by
cooperating. Alternatively, if Vs fails to cooperate, it will be tracked with the probability
of 1. If the number of non-cooperating vehicles is negligible, it is easy to use the X and
X' to model the pseudonyms being sampled and compared by the PA for the total
number of cooperating vehicles, Nc.
HNc = −
Nc∑
i=1
piXX
′ log2 piXX
′ (4.2)
The selﬁsh vehicle will achieve its maximum location privacy and reputation strength
when all eligible vehicles change their pseudonyms.
Naturally, Vs will cooperate to change pseudonyms in order to increase its reputation,
assuming it is below an acceptable threshold. However, when the selﬁsh vehicle's reputa-
tion is near the healthy threshold, it may also choose not to cooperate since it considers
itself reputable, but this situation can be resolved since the system also keeps a record of
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the cooperation behaviour of vehicles. A practical way to do this is to set the minimum
and a maximum number of pseudonym cooperations a vehicle can engage in within a
set period. Hence, Vs will cooperate so that other vehicles will eventually cooperate
with it in the future when it needs a pseudonym change. Otherwise, it endangers itself
if it fails to cooperate since it singles itself out as an easy target for an attacker. The
leads to the possibility that the selﬁsh will naturally prefer to cooperate most of the
time in the future.
4.6 Analysis and Evaluation
Simulations are carried out using various vehicle densities travelling around the realistic
map of the city of Helsinki. First, a key performance measure is to study the impact
of the proposed scheme on the pseudonym change behaviour of vehicles. To study this,
two experiments are performed- one with OFMS enabled and the other with OFMS
disabled (the control experiment). A variant of the above experiment where the number
of vehicles is varied was also carried out. The objective here is to study how the density
of vehicles aﬀects the mix-zone and pseudonym change process. Naturally, it is expected
that higher vehicle densities translate to more chances of vehicles ﬁnding pseudonym
change partners.
Average Number of Pseudonym Change Responses
The objective here is to evaluate the likelihood of vehicles to accept and honour the PCR
requests of a select set of vehicles. This is an indication of the impact the scheme has
on the cooperation of vehicles towards location privacy. The experiment performed is
done using a vehicle density of 250. All vehicles use a transmission range of 100 meters,
travelling at 30km - 60km per hour (this is the allowed speed regulation in the City of
Helsinki which is the default simulation map). The simulation was for 6 hours, with
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Figure 4.2: Average pseudonym change per vehicle
10 simulation iterations averaged over the simulation period of 6 hours. Out of the 250
vehicles, a sample set of 5 vehicles is selected to initiate the pseudonym change requests
at random times. As highlighted previously, the proposed scheme enables vehicles to
set their privacy requirements by by selecting the number of collaborators needed at
each pseudonym time. The scenario is emulated by setting a minimum and a maximum
number of required pseudonym collaborators of 20 and 50 vehicles. Knowing that there
are a total 250 vehicles in the network, a vehicle may enter into pseudonym negotiation
as often as it is able to. The result of the experiment performed is shown in Fig. 4.2 (also
summarised in Table 4.2). The average number of vehicles that cooperate to change
pseudonyms in the two scenarios - one with OFMS enabled(labelled OFMS), and the
other with OFMS disabled (labelled Basic which acts as the control experiment) are
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Table 4.2: Summary of Basic vs. OFMS Schemes
# of Responses
(Basic)
# of Responses
(OFMS)
% of Responses
(Basic)
% of Responses
(OFMS)
40 46 80 92
33 39 66 78
26 28 52 56
32 36 64 72
32 35 64 70
compared. Both schemes employ the Spray and Wait routing protocol. However, any
of the routing protocols discussed in Appendix A can be used since the thesis is not
focusing on routing protocol performance. The diﬀerences in the bars can be attributed
to the dynamics of the network; some vehicles are known to frequent more denser areas
than others. That aﬀects the average number of contacts made. This is expected since
the density aﬀects the number of contacts made per simulation time as discussed in
Chapter Two. The results of the experiment is summarised in Table 4.2. Each row
of the table represents the average pseudonym responses received by the pseudonym
change initiators - the ﬁrst columns being the number of responses and the last two
columns is the number of responses represented as a percentage. As expected, it is
observed that there is about 8% rise in the number of responses from 4% when OFMS
was introduced with highest responses for the OFMS scheme at 92% compared to the
Basic scheme at 80%. On average, 65.2% responded in the Basic scheme compared to
73.6% in the OFMS scheme.
Impact of the Proposed Scheme on Pseudonym Change: Varying Number
of Vehicles
In the second experiment, with results shown in Fig. 4.3, the thesis studies the rela-
tionship between the vehicle density and the success of pseudonym change. Note that
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Figure 4.3: Average Pseudonym Change versus Vehicle Density
in the previous experiment in 4.2, the number of vehicles is ﬁxed at 250 vehicles. In
this experiment, the number of vehicles is varied from 50 to 250 with an increment of
50 for each simulation run. Each simulation is run for 6 hours in 10 iterations, taking
average values. As expected, it is observed that there is about a 6 to 10.5% increase
in the number of collaborators when the proposed scheme is introduced. The slight
variation in the response displayed in Fig. 4.3 can be attributed to the dynamics of the
network in terms of vehicle mobility with each simulation run yielding slightly albeit
close values for the number of collaborators.
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Figure 4.4: Proposed Extension to the OFMS Scheme (circles represent RSU coverage
areas)
4.7 Possible Extensions to the OFMS Scheme
So far, the proposed solution focused on the early stage deployment of VANETs. In
this section, possible extension to the OFMS scheme focusing on full-scale deployment
scenarios is explored. The key features of the extension is as follows (see Fig. 4.4):
• The proposed extension is based on a grouping protocol by an RSU; it is assumed
that the RSUs are positioned at strategic positions along the simulation area to
provide adequate infrastructure support typical of the later stages of deployment.
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• When a vehicle enters a region such as a road section and in need of pseudonym
change, they send PCRs to the nearest RSU.
• The PCRs from diﬀerent vehicles are stored by the RSU covering that segment.
The RSUs then aggregates the requests based on either vehicle reputation or
level/strength of location of privacy at the time of the request.
• At the appropriate time, RSU will inform vehicles to switch to new pseudonyms
irrespective of their location. This means that vehicles do not necessarily have
to be within communication range of one another to change pseudonyms. Hence,
irrespective of the vehicle location, the RSU can still reach the vehicle, after a
time Mt when the PCR was sent. It is assumed that the RSUs are connected via a
wire-line link which facilitates the synchronization of PCRs received by diﬀerent
RSUs at diﬀerent locations and road segments.
Diﬀerent from the basic OFMS, the proposed extension has the advantage that the RSUs
are aware of the location privacy requirements of vehicles. Based on that knowledge,
they forward Pseudonym Change Notiﬁcation Messages (PCNMs) to vehicles. This can
easily be accomplished using a modiﬁed version of the route summarization protocol
[97]. The concept of route summarization (also known as route aggregation) is a Cisco
technology which is used in large inter-networks with thousands of network addresses
to reduce the number of routes that a router must maintain. It is a method used to
represent a series of network numbers with a single summary address.
4.7.1 Details of the Protocol Extension
• When vehicle Vi is in need of pseudonym change, both Vi and RSU i authenticates
themselves.
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• If authentication is successful, Vi sends a PCR PCRi with its certiﬁcate Certi
and a public key P ri together with signature for the pubic key Signi.
PCRi = {Certi, P ri , Signi} (4.3)
• The PCRi is then encrypted with the public key P ru of RSU i based on the assigned
keys by the TKM via a PKI.
• The encrypted request PCRi is then sent to RSU i via a delay tolerant routing
protocol(any routing protocol can be used (see Appendix A)). Since the messages
are event-driven (i.e. sent only when there is a need for pseudonym change), the
resulting overhead is expected to be negligible which makes any protocol suitable.
Once the PCR is received by RSU i, it decrypts it, retrieves the contents, and veriﬁes
the certiﬁcate CertV i using the public key. If the veriﬁcation is successful and the
PCR is not a malicious message, the RSU i conﬁrms the authenticity of the signature
on the public key P ri using Vi's public key extracted from Certi. Following successful
veriﬁcation of the PCR, the RSU i creates a table of each vehicles pseudonym signature
with its timestamp and store in its database. This can be used to facilitate revocation
in the future if need be. The subject of revocation is the content of the next chapter
(Chapter 5). It is assumed that the RSUs are distributed, powerful enough and have
large storage space for storing the pseudonym mappings. Moreover, it is more eﬃcient
for RSUs to update their databases instead of relying on the TKM all the time.
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4.7.2 Aggregation of Pseudonym Change Notiﬁcation Messages (PC-
NMs)
Following the successful veriﬁcation of PCR messages, the RSU groups vehicles based
on attributes such as the time of the request, location privacy strength, number of PCCs
a vehicle needs, their reputation or their location. For simplicity, it is assumed that
vehicles are sent PCNMs as shown in Fig. 4.4 based on their location at the time of
sending the PCNM as in [52].
Figure 4.5: Message delivery probability of OFMS-x
Figure 4.6: Message delivery overhead of OFMS-x
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4.7.3 Analysis and Evaluation
The performance metrics used for evaluation are the message delivery probability and
delivery overhead. The message delivery probability is a measure of the proportion of
messages that have been delivered out of the total unique messages initially created for
delivery. The overhead ratio is the transmission cost incurred in delivering messages
across the network. It is the total number of messages transmitted in the simulation
divided by the total number of messages created. Due to the "store-carry-and-forward"
nature of DTNs, message delivery is made in an "opportunistic" fashion i.e. messages
can only be delivered when nodes come in contact with each other. This means that
some messages can time out and get dropped [10]. The latency is the measure of the
average delay in the network from when a message is created to when it is ﬁnally received
at its destination.
The simulation involves a total of 150 vehicles and 3 RSUs deployed in the Helsinki
city map. For each simulation run, PCR messages are sent from the RSU to the group
of vehicles ranging from 50 to 150 with an increment of 50. The multi-copy routing
capability of the Spray and Wait protocol is used to ensure redundancy in the message
delivery. The results of the delivery overhead and delivery are plotted against the time-
to-live of the messages (TTL) which range from 5 to 25 minutes. The TTL represents
the maximum allowable time it takes a packet to travel from source to destination before
being discarded by a router. For comparisons and validating, the closest scheme is the
AVATAR scheme proposed by [12]. The results are compared with the scheme in [12]
which is the closest to this proposal. The authors propose a dynamic pseudonym change
scheme based on virtual nodes to make up for inadequate pseudonym collaborators.
As shown in Fig. 4.5, it is observed that the delivery probability increases with the
TTL as expected. The delivery probability at 25 minutes TTL represents an increase
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of almost 50% from TTL at 5 minutes. The same is also true for the increase in the
number of vehicles which facilitates the routing of messages from source to destination.
Similar to [12], it is seen that the delivery probability increases with both the TTL and
the vehicle density rising to more than 50% when the TTL is about 10 minutes.
In Fig. 4.6, the delivery overhead decreases with the diﬀerent vehicle densities consid-
ered with the lowest overhead recorded for vehicle density of 150. This represents a 34%
decrease in delivery overhead from 50 to 150 vehicles as the TTL increases from 5 to 25
seconds. This can be attributed to more vehicles being introduced into the network to
help forward PCNMs.
4.8 Trust-Based Scheme for Location Privacy
In this section, the thesis seeks to validate and demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the
proposed scheme over AVATAR[12] and the traditional mix-zone scheme [47]. The
Jaccard Similarity Index (JSI) has been introduced to the proposed novel scheme [98].
The Jaccard similarity index is a classical similarity measure on sets with useful practical
applications in information retrieval, data mining, machine learning, and many others.
The Jaccard Similarity Index (JSI) J and the complementary Jaccard distance Jδ for
vehicles exchanging context messages is formally deﬁned as below. The ﬁnite sets are
representative of the location traces exchanged by the two vehicles.
J(Vi, Vj) =def
Vi ∩ Vj
Vi ∪ Vj , Jδ(Vi, Vj) =def 1− J(Vi, Vj) = 1−
Vi ∩ Vj
Vi ∪ Vj =
Vi ∩ Vi
Vi ∪ Vj (4.4)
where J(0, 0) = def 1.
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It is assumed that the prior information which may be available to the attacker can
be used to track a vehicle. The objective of the proposed scheme then is to train the
vehicle to evade tracking using the spatiotemporal information available to the vehicles
through the exchange of messages. The attacker can perform various attacks on vehicles
by taking advantage of the contextual information contained BSM messages exchanged
with vehicles. The type of attack the adversary can perform depends on the ability of
the attacker and its reach. The adversary model considered includes a Global Passive
Adversary (GPA) and Global Active Adversary (GAA) that both passively listen and
actively engages in packet exchange with vehicles. The Encounter Record (ER) formed
by the encounters between vehicles is used to deﬁne a location privacy framework based
on the JSI explained above. The framework can be in the form of a tuple made up of the
following elements: a set of vehicles, vehicles traces in the form of basic safety messages
that contain location information, the privacy technique that is used on the BSMs, the
global adversary, and the BSMs available to the adversary. The adversary executes
a multi-target attack and tracking to perform an inference and reconstruction of the
obtained contents of the BSMs as discussed in Chapter 3. It also participates in the
forwarding and receiving of packets and observes traces of vehicle mobility by studying
mobility traces around the monitored area. The communication between vehicles is
facilitated through the underlying routing scheme used which incorporates some Social-
feature Based Routing (SBR) schemes [99]. The concept of SBR is popular in DTN
environments where the idea is to utilise common social features of an individual for
routing guidance.
In determining the similarities in attributes between two forwarding individuals, several
features can be used. These may include position information in the form of Point of
Interest (PoI), direction, level of trust, past history of cooperation and speed in addition
to those stated previously. Note that the PoI contain details about location coordinates
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of the vehicles. While the main intuition behind SBR routing is that people come in
contact more frequently if they have more social features in common, this thesis applies
diﬀerently. The social feature of choice is the PoI - depending on the similarities between
the PoIs of two vehicles, they may decide to trust each and exchange packets or avoid
doing so.
Since the vehicles are mobile while the stationary adversary deploys its tracker around
the monitored area, the vehicles can easily determine who is an attacker using the PoI
information received. The assumption is that the adversary doesn't move, even when
it does, the margin of the change in its location information should not be much so the
vehicles still can suspect a suspicious PoI. Why would the adversary move when it is
expected to be stationary? It can move in order to deceive mobile vehicles.
As an example, let's assume there is a set of users within or moving towards an inter-
section that is partitioned into regions which is a geospatial area. Due to the nature of
the communication in DTNs, space and time granularity will determine the precision
to be achieved which can be measured by the length of the total observation and size
of the area. Let's say that Vi with elements {x, y, z} share {x, y, z, z} and {x, y, z,
z, z} representing PoIs with Vj and V
′
j respectively, using the JSI equation the SI can
be seen to be 0.75 and 0.60 respectively. From inspection, the interaction between Vi
and V ′j yielded a lower value of the SI. This means that the PoIs are more similar than
the interaction with Vj (too similar implies that the other party is the attacker, too
dissimilar implies that the other party is not the attacker).
In schemes such as [100, 99], similarities are measured based on the common features
in the message attributes of the tuples. This is similar to measuring the relative size of
the overlap of two ﬁnite sets using the JSI. In conventional JSI schemes, the idea is to
compute similarities, such similarities are then used to ascertain the suitability of the
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recipient vehicle to forward packets to a destination. This contribution makes a novel
digression from that direction and rather use such similarities to identify an attacker
vehicle. In the end, such knowledge is incorporated into the native routing scheme to
avoid the attacker thereby achieving location privacy. Note that the higher the entropy,
the lower the attacker's certainty in tracking its target. As an example, assuming two
sets of messages exchanged between Vi and Vj have similarities of 0.52 and 0.56. This
similarity can be calculated using a variety of indices contained in the messages.
Over time, vehicles incorporate this knowledge into the forwarding decisions and avoid
the attacker. From a practical perspective, if a vehicle repeatedly registers the same
POIs consecutively within a short period of time, even if there are slight diﬀerences in
the values, it must be the stationary attacker. Again, note that this scheme addresses a
MTT attacker with wireless devices set up at a road junction to track vehicles. Finally,
this behaviour is incorporated into the routing decision and thus achieves some location
privacy where suspect vehicles intelligently avoid the attacker.
Figure 4.7: Entropy for diﬀerent SI values)
In order to validate the proposed scheme in terms of the level of location privacy
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achieved, the relationship between entropy for diﬀerent SI values is shown in Fig. 4.7.
The entropy is evaluated for diﬀerent SI values of 0. to 0.3 using a vehicle density of 250
on a highway scenario. The results show that lower SI values yield higher entropy for
vehicles. It can be seen that the entropy increases as the SI values decrease. In other
words, lower SI values yield higher entropy values. The maximum value of the entropy
which is about 5.9 for the SI value of 0.2(4.2 for the proposed scheme in Fig. 4.8 in Fig.
4.7 varies depedning on the individual scenario.
In Table 4.3, the experiment above is repeated with a vehicle density of 30 vehicles
for diﬀerent SI values of 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, and the entropy measured for recorded at
diﬀerent time intervals ranging from 2 to 30 minutes. The values follow a similar trend
namely with the lower SI values yielding higher entropies.
Table 4.3: The Entropy for Diﬀerent SIs
Time(min) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
SI0.2 0.35 0.41 0.49 0.60 0.74 0.90 1.13 1.38 1.69 1.98 2.33 2.72 3.31 3.58 4.08
SI0.3 0.14 0.24 0.32 0.44 0.54 0.66 0.80 0.96 1.14 1.34 1.56 1.81 2.08 2.37 2.68
SI0.4 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.301 0.381 0.471 0.581 0.721 0.881 1.071 1.196 1.362 1.561 1.772
To validate the proposed scheme in terms of the level of location privacy achieved,
the results in Fig. 4.8 is compared with the AVATAR scheme in [12]. The results
represent the simulation of 30 vehicles with a low-density early deployment scenario.
The result shows that the proposed scheme performs better and guarantees a higher
level of protection compared to AVATAR and Mix-zone schemes. The more signiﬁcant
observation seen in the results is the increase in entropy as the time increases from 0
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Figure 4.8: Performance of the proposed scheme compared to AVATAR and Mix-zone
to 30 minutes with the entropy signiﬁcantly increasing just after the 5 minutes mark.
This is most likely due to the fact that vehicles in DTNs environments start slowly
and builds their interactions and encounters over time. As the level of activity on the
network increases, the attacker becomes more confused even around the target region.
Secondly, since it takes some time for vehicles to build their interactions, it may also
take a while for activities such as exchange of broadcast messages to reach a climax
after the network initiation. In this case, it took about 0 to 5 minutes for network
devices to begin full and reasonable interactions among themselves, thereby confusing
the attacker.
Validation and Comparison with AVATAR
In Chapter 3, the performance evaluation of PETS was performed using OMNeT++[101]
as a validation tool with mix-zone, silent period, Mutually Obfuscating Paths(MOP)
and k-Anonymity schemes as benchmarks. Fig. 4.9(a) and (b) was implemented with
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the same settings as the AVATAR scheme using OMNeT++ and the ONE simulator
respectively. The simulation was run with 200 vehicles deployed in an area of 4000 m
x 4000 m with an average speed of 1.8 to 5.4 km/h using the shortest-path mobility
model. The ONE simulator was used as a validation tool for the experiment which
is suitable for resource-constrained networks and also used by the benchmark scheme.
Each vehicle's transmission coverage was set to 100 m and uses the S&W routing pro-
tocol to evaluate the location privacy gain (used here for consistency with the AVATAR
benchmark scheme). The proposed scheme was compared to the benchmark scheme
(AVATAR) under the same simulation setting. The AVATAR scheme is a cooperative
location privacy scheme which is based on opportunistic collaboration for sparse DTN.
For each experiment, observations were collected from suﬃcient simulation runs with
disjoint random number streams to achieve 5% accuracy and 95% conﬁdence. The sim-
ulation results in Fig. 4.9(a) and (b) are remarkably similar to the benchmark with an
average mean square error between the simulation and analytical results less than ±5%.
The results presented earlier in Fig. 4.8 were based on the highway scenario considered
in the thesis. This is because location privacy is often evaluated using highway scenarios
(junctions)[71, 11, 74]. The attackers are placed at the junctions to track the process
of changing pseudonym which happens at junctions by linking the movement traces
from diﬀerent vehicles. Speciﬁcally, the simulation time was considered in the previous
experiments because a highway scenario was used. However, it has been observed that
AVATAR performs better than the proposed scheme when the TTL is less than 8-10
minutes, this is as a result of the number of messages replicated by multi-copy routing
protocols. However, beyond the TTL of 10 minutes, the proposed scheme achieves a
higher location privacy when compared to AVATAR. This is because location privacy
in the proposed scheme is measured after the trust establishment from the pairwise
encounter between neighbouring vehicles. As the number of encountered nodes increase,
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the adversary easily correlates the broadcast messages including the reward mechanisms
(acknowledgement) from collaborators in tracing the trajectory of targeted nodes. In
the proposed scheme, the location privacy mechanism is implemented in the routing
process which enables the successful formulation of encounter records, computation
of direct and indirect trustworthiness of neighbouring vehicles and evaluation of the
proposed location privacy scheme.
Figure 4.9: Validation and Comparison with AVATAR
The results show that the opportunistic collaborators in AVATAR form a virtual mix
zone once there is a message acknowledgement using Hash maps (footprint signatures).
This results in a higher location privacy compared to the proposed scheme after the ﬁrst
few messages have been received. Although the performance of the AVATAR scheme
was demonstrated using varying vehicle densities of 150, 200, and 250, it can be observed
that the trend shown by the AVATAR scheme is strikingly similar to that of Fig. 4.9(a)
and (b) above for TTLs of 5 to 30 minutes.
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4.9 Summary
The selﬁsh behaviour of vehicles is established as an issue that is a major hindrance
to the pseudonym change in disconnected VANETs. The implications of such a be-
haviour are studied and the thesis proposed a solution to address it. The proposed
scheme is based on the mix-zone technology which is well known in the ﬁeld of location
privacy as an eﬀective means of ensuring that vehicles change their pseudonyms with
reduced tracking probability by a privacy attacker. However, the proposed solution
diﬀers slightly from the conventional pseudonym scheme in that vehicles can establish
mix-zones on the ﬂy. In addition, there is no need to set up costly infrastructure such
as RSUs to coordinate pseudonym change as is the tradition in most existing schemes.
The absence of RSUs will also reduce the overheads in communication. The ineﬃciency
of conventional pseudonym schemes which are based on the assumption of an already
established mix-zone is also discussed. Such schemes lack ﬂexibility and are restrictive
with respect to the time and location requirements for pseudonym change. To address
the observed problems, PriSerV - a privacy-enhancing scheme based on mix-zone is
proposed. Diﬀerent from conventional mix-zones, PriSerV incorporates an on-the-ﬂy
mix-zone formation module that does not depend on the presence of RSUs for sup-
port. More importantly, vehicles can have control of the pseudonym change process in
that they can form mix-zones at a desired time and location. Again, vehicles have a
ﬁne-grained control in terms of the level of privacy required at each point in time. A
static game scheme was also introduced as a means of encouraging selﬁsh vehicles to
contribute to pseudonym change and improve the overall privacy of the network. The
results show the relationship between mobility patterns in the network and the privacy
level achievable. The simulation results show the feasibility of the proposed scheme.
The proposed OFMS scheme shows an 8% increase in the pseudonym change for a vehi-
cle density of 250 vehicles. By varying the vehicle density from 50 to 250, it is observed
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that about 6 to 10% increase in the pseudonym change compared to the basic scheme.
Compared to a similar scheme in [12], the proposed OFMS-x show a 50% increase in
the delivery probability which agrees with the baseline scheme. The OFMS-x scheme
also shows a considerable decrease in the delivery overhead even with the increase in the
number of vehicles in the network. More importantly, the proposed scheme is compared
with two other well-referenced schemes in terms of the level of privacy achieved. The
compared schemes are the AVATAR and Mix-zone schemes as shown in 4.8. In the next
chapter, the thesis discusses the issue of misbehaviour in more detail including how a
proposed approach to the revocation of such malicious vehicles.
Chapter 5
Delay Tolerant Vehicle Revocation
for VANETs
5.1 Introduction
While Chapter 2 and 3 of the thesis address issues related to privacy and selﬁsh vehicles,
this chapter explores revocation of vehicles that disrupt network activity through ma-
licious behaviour.This section addresses the challenge of vehicle revocation due to mis-
behaviour in an intermittently connected VANET for ITS infrastructure. The proposed
revocation scheme involves a misbehaviour detection system based on trust and opinion
aggregation from vehicle encounters. A vehicle's opinion about the behaviour of an-
other is used to make decisions concerning the revocation of privileges. The trust-based
scheme identiﬁes a vehicle's malicious activity using two pre-deﬁned metrics namely mes-
sage delivery and drop probability. The ﬁndings from the trust-based misbehaviour de-
tection scheme are used to implement the proposed Delay-Tolerant Revocation Scheme
(DTRvS). A detailed description of the proposed revocation mechanism, including an
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evaluation and analysis of results obtained is given. The attitude of malicious vehicles
towards misbehaviour reporting and CRL distribution is also discussed.
A credit-based scheme aimed at coercing selﬁsh vehicles to report misbehaviour and
distribute CRL messages in an eﬃcient manner is devised. The thesis also provides a
security and eﬃciency analysis of the proposed scheme in comparison to other schemes.
Finally, a summary of ﬁndings is provided as well as a discussion on the economics of
revocation and its implications on network security.
5.1.1 Motivation for DTRvS
A major issue in vehicular networks is ensuring entity- and data-oriented trust. Entity-
oriented trust involves the assurance that vehicles partaking in network communication
are trustworthy enough and can follow the strict security protocols of the system to
deliver safety messages securely and eﬃciently [102]. Data-oriented trust, on the other
hand, focuses on the trustworthiness of the exchanged messages between diﬀerent net-
work entities. Vehicles in a VANET can misbehave in a variety of ways including packet
dropping(of BSM messages) and falsiﬁcation of location information. Alteration and
delay of messages by relay vehicles can critically impact the accuracy of driving deci-
sions and may even lead to an incident such as collision on the road. It is important
to ensure that location messages exchanged between vehicles are not dropped, altered
or delayed en-route to their destinations. In the next section, the drawbacks of existing
schemes are highlighted and justiﬁcation for the proposed DTRvS made.
5.1.2 Drawbacks of Existing Schemes
Although authentication mechanisms ensure the authenticity of vehicles joining and
using the network, even genuinely authenticated vehicles can still misbehave and inject
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bogus messages into the network [68, 103]. Hence, data trust becomes as important
as entity-oriented trust. A key requirement is to ensure the BSMs are unaltered and
reliable enough for making driving decisions [41]. However, during the course of the
operation of the network, due to selﬁsh or other malicious intentions, some vehicles
may deviate from normal protocol operation and misbehave in order to mislead other
vehicles and put them at risk [68, 69]. Vehicle misbehaviour can be broadly classiﬁed into
deliberate or non-deliberate misbehaviour. Deliberate misbehaviour means intentional
misbehaviour in which a vehicle chooses to announce fake location messages, while
non-deliberate misbehaviour can be due to a faulty component or software malfunction
in say, the OBU or other sensor components. Irrespective of the reason, there is a
need to isolate such vehicles from participating in network communication. In [41],
the authors point out that authentication alone cannot solve the trust issue in VANETs
since it does not address the quality of messages exchanged. Furthermore, the operating
environment of ITS especially in the early stages of deployment where the network
exhibits intermittent connectivity similar to DTNs and VDTNs poses major challenges
in detecting malicious behaviour, and in eliminating malicious vehicles from network
communication. In the next sections, some preliminaries necessary to understand the
DTRvS proposal is discussed.
5.1.3 Main Contributions
The key contributions made in this chapter are as follows:
• First, a distributed trust-based scheme to identify and mitigate maliciousness in
a VANET is formulated. The proposed scheme is delay-tolerant and scalable even
under high vehicle density and mobility. The trust scheme assumes the use of
bilinear pairing techniques namely Weil and Tate pairings on elliptic curves.
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• A novel disruption tolerant revocation scheme (DTRvS) for IC-VANETs which
can both detect misbehaviour and distribute CRLs in an eﬃcient and scalable
manner is proposed. This means that the proposed scheme is tailored to be aware
of the network operating environment and can distribute CRLs in an eﬃcient
manner while relying on a few stationary RSUs.
• The chapter proposes a scheme tailored to incentivize vehicles into reporting mis-
behaviour in order to improve the revocation process.
5.2 Model Description
A similar network model as in the previous chapters is used and a distributed hier-
archical architecture based on the European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) and Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) recommendations
with multiple TKMs and CAs is assumed. The initial registration involves attribute
veriﬁcation, issuance of certiﬁcates and keys for signing messages as well as the es-
tablishment of methods for trust, misbehaviour detection and veriﬁcation, and vehicle
revocation. The TKMs are responsible for the generation and dissemination of CRLs.
They maintain a dictionary-like list of attack and misbehaviour types which is also
installed on each vehicle's OBU and the RSUs.
Each vehicle also develops an opinion of other vehicles it interacts with. The opinion
is used to build the trust vehicles have on each other after the interaction in the form
of opinion scores. Vehicle encounters with each other can be direct or indirect (see
Fig. 5.1). The diagram demonstrates how trust is established between three vehicles
Vi, Vj and Vk through direct and indirect encounters. The details of the misbehaviour
detection scheme are described later in Section 5.3.3.
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Figure 5.1: Establishing Trust Relationship Between Vehicles
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In addition to extending the telecommunication infrastructure, the key function of the
RSUs serve as the veriﬁers of misbehaviour reports from vehicles. The RSUs are de-
ployed in a distributed manner and directly report to the TKMs via a reliable secure
wired communication channel that issues the ﬁnal revocation order. They can also play
a role in the incentive scheme for rewarding vehicles that report malicious activity. They
are assumed to be reliable and can store messages in a DTN fashion to be ooaded to
the next available carrier vehicle in a multi-hop fashion [9].
5.2.1 Attacker Model
Two types of malicious vehicles were mentioned earlier - those deliberately malicious
and those with malfunctioning components. The thesis make no distinctions between
the two for reasons of safety, in the sense that each type of malicious behaviour poses
a risk to the operation of the network. The model closely follows that deﬁned in [104]
where malicious attackers drop packets. However, the proposed scheme can be tweaked
to support a variety of other attack types. Speciﬁcally, a network where a signiﬁcant
percentage of the vehicles say 10 - 50% are malicious is considered. Note that the
TKM may deﬁne diﬀerent attack types on initialization which is bootstrapped on each
vehicle's OBU. Subsequently, new attack types can be added to the list as new deﬁnitions
of malicious behaviour emerge.
5.3 Details of the Proposed DTRvS Scheme
In this section, a preliminary discussions is provided to set the stage towards an un-
derstanding of the DTRvS scheme. The section provides a general overview and the
details of the individual components that form the foundation for the proposed revo-
cation scheme. It also describes the CRL forwarding strategy based on delay tolerant
5.3. Details of the Proposed DTRvS Scheme 112
routing as the basis for eﬃcient vehicle revocation.
The delay-sensitive operating environment of IC-VANETs calls for novel techniques in
the design of certiﬁcate revocation and distribution that are eﬃcient in terms of latency
(and delay tolerance) in order to avert crisis and economic loss [105] early enough after
malicious vehicles are identiﬁed. In the past, the following methods have been adopted
to distribute CRLs [105]:
• request-response
• publish-subscribe
• blacklist broadcast
• whitelist broadcast
• publish with proxy subscribe
The IETF94 DTN Working Group recommends the publish with proxy subscribe tech-
nique together with δ-CRLs for classical DTNs [105, 106] where a dedicated Certiﬁcate
Revocation Manager (CRM) handles the revocation operation. The proposed scheme
seeks to answer the question of how to ensure eﬃcient revocation in IC-VANETs in a de-
lay tolerant and distributed manner. Having identiﬁed misbehaving nodes as mentioned
above, a stripped down version of the conventional X.509 CRL certiﬁcate in the form
of δ-CRLs is used in line with the IETF Working Group recommendation [105, 107].
Instead of the usual headers that add too much overhead, the key ﬁelds in the scheme
include the serial number, revocation reason, and the pseudonym with which the event
was signed. A typical X.509 CRL is made up of about 39 bytes in addition to a ﬁxed 400
bytes. The scheme in [107] is adopted which is compliant with the X.509 data structure
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with a total of 38 bytes (a 6-byte serial number, a 12-byte revocation reason number
and a 20-byte pseudonym of the vehicle) with no additional ﬁxed ﬁelds compared to the
standard X.509 CRL. This makes the CRL smaller in size compared to the standard
X.509 CRL.
5.3.1 Bilinear Pairing
The scheme is based on the assumption of bilinear pairing, on which the secure initial-
isation is also based [108, 109] as follows. Let G be a cyclic additive group and GT be
a cyclic multiplicative group; both G and GT are of the same prime order q i.e., |G| =
|GT | = q. The TKM selects P as the generator of G. It is also assumed that eˆ: G × G
→ GT is a bilinear mapping with the following attributes:
• Bilinear : eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ R Zq.
• Non-degenerate: eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1GT .
• Symmetric: eˆ(P,Q) = eˆ(Q,P) for all P,Q ∈ G.
• Admissible: The bilinear map eˆ is eﬃciently computable, i.e., there is an eﬃcient
algorithm to compute eˆ(Px, Qy) for any Px, Qy ∈ G.
According to [110], such an admissible bilinear map eˆ can be implemented using Tate
[108] and Weil's [109] pairing based on elliptic curve techniques. Usually, the security
of the proposed scheme will depend on the ability of the attacker to solve the hard
computational problem as follows:
• Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): given a point P of order q
on an elliptic curve and a point Q on the same curve, then the ECDLP problem
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can be used to determine the integer l, 0 ≤ l ≤ q-1 such that Q = lP.
5.3.2 Trust-Based Misbehaviour Detection and Revocation
In this section, the phases of the trust-based misbehaviour detection and revocation
scheme is described. These include the misbehaviour detection and analysis phase,
misbehaviour reporting and veriﬁcation phase, and credit-based reporting scheme and
certiﬁcate revocation phases. The certiﬁcation revocation phase involves certiﬁcate
revocation and CRL dissemination.
5.3.3 Misbehaviour Detection and Analysis Phase
In the misbehaviour detection phase, the proposed scheme aims to study the impact of
packet dropping attacks on routed BSM messages by malicious vehicles. This ensures
that malicious vehicles are detected early and barred from participating in network
communication through revocation [111]. The misbehaviour detection scheme is based
on a trust- and reputation-based system which not only addresses the message quality
problem but also helps to check the behaviour of individual vehicles themselves. Many
reputation-based schemes have been proposed in the past with one basic goal - to gauge
the health of the network, detecting and reporting the misbehaviour of vehicles sending
messages [69, 112, 113].
A similar trust models as in [114, 112, 115, 104] is adopted. The need to clearly identify
false alarms which can be in the form of false positives and true negatives is necessary
because false alarms can be due to collusion attacks by malicious vehicles to discredit
well-behaved vehicles. In the scheme, there is the challenge of incident reporting due
to the disconnected and dynamic nature of the network. To address this, the tech-
nique of additive reporting based on the majority opinion of reporting vehicles which
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is derived from the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [116] is employed. This is based
on the principle that, during the course of communication, vehicles exchange opinions
regarding their belief in the accuracy of the information they receive and the behaviour
of the vehicles they come into contact and exchange messages with. Similar to [112, 41],
each vehicle's OBU runs a trust module. During each contact opportunity between two
vehicles, say Vi and Vj records their encounter denoted by E
ij
k as expressed in 5.1 below.
Eijk = {e1, e2, e3, ..., en} (5.1)
where each encounter ei ∈ Eijk represents a particular instance or attribute of Vj 's
behaviour such as packet dropping, message delay, timely message forwarding, accurate
or inaccurate location reporting.
In addition, each element of the encounter record may be accorded diﬀerent weights
depending on the importance the receiver/observer vehicle attaches to it. This thesis
only considers packet dropping by vehicle. Let the weight factor be ω, then 5.1 can be
re-written as below. The value of ω = 1 since only the dropping behaviour is considered.
Eijk = ω{e1, e2, e3, ..., en} (5.2)
Components of the Reputation System
After an encounter, a vehicle say Vi records its trust rating or evaluation of the behaviour
which is the sum of its observation
∑
Tij , about vehicle Vj behaviour. The reputation
system can be modelled using the probability of binary events which owes its origin to
beta probability density function. The beta probability density function is a proven
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and valid mathematical foundation for obtaining and combining reputation or opinion
ratings from multiple sources. Such systems owe their origin to the ﬁeld of e-commerce
systems and applications as analysed in the literature on probability theory such as in
[117]. The beta probability density function, F(p|α, β) can be represented with indices
of two parameters α and β, which can be expressed using the gamma function Γ as
shown in 5.3 below.
F (p|(α, β)) = Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1 (5.3)
where 0 6 p 6 1, α > 0, β > 0, and Γ is the gamma function. According to Josang [117],
p 6= 0 if α < 1, and p 6= 1 if β < 1. Hence, the expected value of the beta probability
density function becomes
Ex(p) =
α
(α+ β)
(5.4)
Speciﬁcally, if a vehicle keeps an encounter record as either accurate, CR or inaccurate
IS for instance, and if out of E number of encounters, where CR occurs R times and
IS occurs S times, then the probability density function of CR in future observations
or encounters can be expressed as a function of its previous observed values as in 5.5.
α = R+ 1 and β = S + 1 (5.5)
where R,S ≥ 0. For instance, assuming a vehicle records E encounters classiﬁed under
two possible outcomes {CR, IS} where CR occurs 8 times while IS occurs 2 times, the
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beta function can be expressed as F(p|9, 3). This means that the expected value of CR
is given by Ex(p) = 0.9. Thus, the reputation function can be deﬁned based on Josang's
equation [117] as in Deﬁnition 1 below.
Deﬁnition 1 (Vehicles' Reputation Function:) Let Rij and S ij denote the total
number of accurate and inaccurate records about vehicle Vj as observed by another
vehicle Vi, then the function f (p|Rij , S ij) can be deﬁned as in 5.6 below.
f(p|Rij , Sij) = Γ(Rij + Sij + 2)
Γ(Rij + 1)Γ(Sij + 1)
pRij (1− p)Sij (5.6)
where 0 6 p 6 1, 0 6 Rij , 0 6 Rij . The function f (p|Rij , S ij) can be taken to be
the reputation function of Vj as observed by Vi which is simply writed as f (p|
Vi
Vj
). By
comparing 5.4 to 5.5, the expression can be re-written as
Ex(f(p|Rij , Sij)) = Rij + 1
Rij + Sij + 2
(5.7)
Vehicle Reputation Rating
According to Josang [117], the reputation function suits mathematical manipulation
but is not ideal for communicating reputation to human users. Hence, the use of the
expected value is more ideal since humans are more familiar with the concept of prob-
ability using numbers as estimates. It is then more appropriate to use the reputation
rating which can be evaluated in the range of (0, 1), where a neutral rating can be
chosen arbitrarily depending on system requirements e.g. 0.5 for a neutral rating. A
practical use of the neutral rating is during the initial registration of vehicles where a
vehicle is assigned an average rating to ensure that it is able to establish initial commu-
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nication with new contacts. Note that a vehicle's reputation can increase or decrease
over time depending on its behaviour.
Deﬁnition 2 (Reputation Rating:)Let Rij and S ij denote the total amount of ac-
curate and inaccurate records about vehicle Vj as observed by another vehicle Vi; then
the function Tij(Rij , S ij) deﬁned by
Tij
(
Rij , Sij
)
=
Ex(f(|Rij , Sij))− 0.5
2 = Rij − Sij
Rij + Sij + 2
(5.8)
is the estimate of the trust rating, Tij of Vj by Vi and is written simply as Tij(Vij).
Generally, the reputation rating can be used to express the extent of trust that can be
held for a particular vehicle after the observation period. In particular, in the proposed
scheme, it expresses the behaviour of a target vehicle and can be used by vehicles
and RSUs to advise the TKM about the need to revoke the certiﬁcate of a misbehaving
vehicle. Here, Rij represents the record about Vj in support of good behaviour, whereas
S ViVj represents the record about Vj in support of bad behaviour.
Combining Multiple Reputation Reports
It is possible to combine reputation rating from multiple observers or multiple records
from the same observer over time in order to eﬀectively and convincingly evaluate a
target vehicle. This can be done by combining all the accurate and inaccurate encounter
reports comprising
∑
CR and
∑
IS . The reputation of a vehicle Vj recorded by two
observers Vi and Vk can be respectively expressed as f (p|Rij , S ij) and f (p|Rkj , Skj).The
idea is explored in detail in Deﬁnition 3 below.
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Deﬁnition 3 (Reputation Combination:) Let f (p|Rij , S ij) and f (p|Rkj , Skj) be
reputation functions about Vj as recorded by Vi and Vk. The reputation function
f (p|Rikj , S ikj) is deﬁned by 5.9. Note that the combined reputation report can be
extended to more than two vehicles or encounter records. Equations 5.9 and 5.10 are
Vj 's combined reputation function recorded by Vi and Vk.
RVikj = R
Vi
Vj
+R
Vk
Vj
(5.9)
SVikj = S
Vi
Vj
+ S
Vk
Vj
(5.10)
In more formal terms, the ⊕ operator can be used to represent the combination opera-
tion. Thus, 5.9 and 5.10 can be re-written as
f(p|RVik
Vj
,
Vik
Vj
) = f(p|RVi
Vj
, S
Vi
Vj
)⊕ f(p|RVk
Vj
, S
Vk
Vj
) (5.11)
or simply as
f
Vik
Vj
= f
Vi
Vj
⊕ f Vk
Vj
(5.12)
The combination is commutative and associative under the ⊕ operation meaning that
the order of the functions is not relevant in the calculation. The scheme does not
allow the same reputation function to be counted twice. This is avoided by counting
reputation reports based on the time of the report. This does not mean that older
reports are ignored. Instead, the focus is on speciﬁc time slots and only contacts reports
made within the timeslot is considered. Due to the disconnectedness of the network, the
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need to take into consideration the ageing of a vehicles reputation over time is important.
The ageing of the reputation depends on the frequency of the contact between vehicles,
hence, more frequent contact implies more reliable reputation rating.
5.3.4 Misbehaviour Reporting and Veriﬁcation Phase
In this phase of the scheme, vehicles submit opinions based on their evaluations in the
detection phase to RSUs mentioned in Section 5.3.3 above in an opportunistic manner
using an opportunistic routing protocol such as the Spray and Wait protocol described
in Appendix A. A key objective of this phase is to ensure the detection of false positives
and true negatives due to collusion attacks where malicious vehicles collude to report an
overwhelmingly negative opinion about a non-malicious vehicle for instance. There is
also the possibility that selﬁsh vehicles can collude to protect their interest groups and
not report incidences of misbehaviour. To encourage vehicles to report misbehaviour,
it is easy to incorporate an incentive scheme into the protocol to reward well-behaved
vehicles such as the scheme in [89].
5.3.5 Stimulating Misbehaviour Reporting
An incentive scheme that stimulates vehicles to report malicious behaviour is designed
which is formulated in equation 5.13 below in order to calculate the incentive for re-
porting malicious behaviour. The incentive scheme is key to the eﬃciency of the system
and is meant to persuade more vehicles to report misbehaviour. Recall that vehicles
are supposed to report their evaluations periodically to the TKM via RSUs. When a
vehicle suspects misbehaviour, it sends a message in which it sets a misbehaviour ﬂag
containing its pseudonym identity and that of the reported vehicle. A vehicle Vi's report
can be of the form
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Vi ⇒ RSU{msg, PseuID, T, Sign, Type, eInvoice}Pi (5.13)
where eInvoice is an invoice with which Vi can redeem a credit, msg is the message,
PseuID is the pseudonym identity, Sign is the signature, Type is the type of misbe-
haviour, and Pi is the public key of Vi. How can the credit be used by the vehicle?
The credit can be used by electric vehicles as vouchers to re-charge their batteries.
To encourage more cooperation, vehicles can be compensated based on the number of
accurate misbehaviour reports submitted to the TKM.
5.3.6 Certiﬁcate Revocation and CRL Dissemination Phase
Vehicle revocation involves techniques through which a convicted malicious vehicle's
privileges and right of access to network resources is terminated or suspended. The
authors in [118, 119] have shown that incorrect location information from even as little as
10% of the vehicles in the network can impact on safety message delivery rate drastically.
Two main situations where vehicle revocation is required was mentioned earlier. First,
when a malicious vehicle deliberately sends modiﬁed or manipulated messages. Sec-
ondly, a vehicle that sends invalid messages due to a malfunctioning OBU device, a
technical problem in its components or a software bug. Irrespective of the primary
cause, such malicious vehicles must be ex-communicated from the network at the earli-
est possible time. In addition to scalable and eﬃcient revocation in terms of timeliness,
revocation cost such as bandwidth costs, it is vital that the privacy of revoked vehicles
is not jeopardized.
Some factors considered in this scheme which aﬀect revocation in VANETs include the
delay involved in reporting and verifying maliciousness as well as the delay incurred in
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distributing the revocation information (CRL). These delays, especially those incurred
in distributing CRLs, result in a vulnerability window for other well-behaved vehicles
that may not be informed of the malicious tendencies or actions of such ill-behaved
vehicles [120]. The vulnerability window creates a time delay so that well-behaved
vehicles fail to receive CRL updates early enough to prevent them from being corrupted
by malicious vehicles. Ultimately, the vulnerability window needs to be as small as
possible to avoid possible damages. For example, vehicles need to receive CRL updates
early enough in order to inform well-behaved vehicles ahead of time prior to receiving
malicious messages from malicious vehicles. In disconnected VANETs, these delays are
increased due to the opportunist nature of contacts between vehicles and RSUs. Hence,
the vulnerability window is taken into consideration in the design of the proposed scheme
and simulation studies. This also informed the choice of opportunistic routing protocols
throughout the experiments and the use of RSUs for improved coverage.
After the misbehaviour detection phase, the essence of CRL distribution is to ensure that
messages signed by vehicles with revoked certiﬁcates are disregarded by other vehicles.
For this, there are two possibilities. First, it is possible to send CRLs to misbehaving
vehicles to self-revoke themselves and stop signing messages. CRL messages can also
be ﬂooded to all vehicles within the network. However, ﬂooding has been found to
be bandwidth intensive especially in a constrained network. Secondly, non-malicious
vehicles are informed of the identities of malicious vehicles in order to prevent them from
processing messages received from the malicious vehicles. This option is adopted in the
implementation since it helps reduce the vulnerability window. The proposed scheme
is based on a distributed and hierarchical system where the revocation responsibility is
split between the TKMs and RSUs [85]. The TKMs issue revocation orders while the
RSUs distribute the CRLs. In the proposed scheme, the objective is to send the CRLs
to healthy non-malicious vehicles ﬁrst. This way, the vulnerability window is reduced
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and the potential damages due to erroneous messages contained beforehand. The X.509
standard [121] also deﬁnes several states of a certiﬁcate, including the hold and revoked
states. A certiﬁcate in the revoked state is also considered irreversibly revoked. The
hold state is ﬂagged against a certiﬁcate when it is established that such a certiﬁcate
has been improperly issued by a fake TKM, or the private-key has been compromised.
Unlike the revoked state, the hold state of a certiﬁcate is considered reversible and shows
that a certiﬁcate is temporarily invalid. A vehicle certiﬁcate can be ﬂagged oﬀ into the
hold state for reasons such as if the vehicle holding it is uncertain if the private key it
received is lost or stolen. Once it is established that the key has not been tampered
with during the period of the hold state, the status can then be reversed. This results
in the TKM removing the certiﬁcate from the CRLs in the future. Other reasons why
a certiﬁcate may be revoked or held is due to validity versus expiry issues. However,
it is noteworthy that a certiﬁcate may be expired, yet still valid. This implies that all
expired certiﬁcates should be ﬂagged as invalid. Hence, a more robust scheme such as
the trust scheme described above is needed to avoid errors that can arise in verifying
misbehaviour reports and ensure proper key management.
5.3.7 Issues with CRL Distribution: Incentive Scheme for Misbe-
haviour Reporting
This chapter discussed the reluctance of selﬁsh vehicles to report misbehaviour. In
the same manner, some vehicles also inhibit the distribution of CRLs messages where
some vehicles can delay or drop CRL messages from reaching their destinations. The
intermittent nature of connections in IC-VANETs presents a new set of challenges for
the revocation system. It was highlighted that although it is not possible for malicious
vehicles to cause harm during the brief moments of disconnection since they cannot
send messages, their certiﬁcates should still be revoked as soon as possible. There
5.4. Performance Analysis and Evaluation 124
are existing works regarding revocation mechanisms. Although previous work assumed
reliable connectivity [63], the closest to the proposed scheme is the work in [113] where
the authors used a scheme where there is no PKI, which makes misbehaviour more
diﬃcult to detect.
CRL Distribution using History of Encounters
Some vehicles also inhibit the distribution of CRLs messages where some vehicles can
delay or drop CRL messages from reaching their destinations. The intermittent nature
of connections in IC-VANETs presents a new set of challenges for the revocation system
in terms of delivering CRLs in a timely manner. While previous work assumed reliable
connectivity [63], the closest to the proposed scheme is the work in [113], the authors
used a scheme where there is no PKI, such a system makes misbehaviour more diﬃcult
to detect. To improve the eﬃciency of CRL delivery, the proposed scheme employed
the technique of encounter based routing of CRL messages. The basic idea behind the
scheme is that vehicles will most likely pass messages to regularly encountered contacts
than those they do not encounter frequently. Similar encounter-based routing techniques
known as Encounter-Based Routing (EBR) is used in [122].
5.4 Performance Analysis and Evaluation
In this section, the simulation set-up is described and the results evaluated to show the
feasibility of the proposed scheme.
5.4.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation involves vehicles and RSUs deployed in downtown Helsinki, Finland
measuring 4500 x 3400 m2 as in previous experiments. The vehicles move with a vari-
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able speed of 25 - 30 km−h while the RSUs are positioned at selected locations around
the simulation area. Generally, similar settings as in the previous experimnets are main-
tained. For example, all simulations use map-based mobility model. However, where
necessary, the set of simulation parameters speciﬁc to each experiment corresponding
to each result analysed are mentioned in the sections that follow.
5.4.2 Analysis of Results
In this section, the impact on the delivery of safety messages under varying degrees of
maliciousness in the network is demonstrated. Then, a detailed account of the perfor-
mance of the proposed revocation scheme is presented. The evaluation metrics include
the message delivery ratio and delivery probability under the inﬂuence of malicious ve-
hicles. Finally, an explanation of the relationship between the performance metrics and
the eﬃciency of the protocol is given.
Impact of Malicious Vehicles on Message Delivery Probability
In Fig. 5.2, it is shown message dropping by malicious vehicles aﬀects the delivery
probability of BSM messages. The message delivery probability reﬂects the ratio of the
total number of messages delivered to the total number of messages initially created for
delivery as shown in 5.14.
DP =
MD
MC
(5.14)
As a preliminary, the impact of the malicious vehicle on the delivery probability is vital
to the design of the revocation scheme in terms of the CRL delivery probability. Here,
an almost equivalent decrease in the delivery probability values for both Spray & Wait
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Figure 5.2: Delivery Probability vs. Number of Malicious Vehicles
and PRoPHET routing protocols is observed.
CRL Delivery Probability vs. Number of Malicious Vehicles with DTRvS
In Fig. 5.3, the performance of the proposed scheme with respect to CRL delivery
probability is presented. The signiﬁcance of the results here suggests that the pro-
posed scheme is able to coerce more vehicles to relay CRL messages in the presence of
malicious. The experiment is carried out with a malicious vehicle density which was in-
creased from 0 to 50% of the total number of vehicles. As expected, Fig. 5.3 highlights
a decrease in the delivery probability corresponding to malicious densities from 0 to
50%. Two schemes were used in the experiment namely Spray & Wait and the adapted
scheme DTRvS. From 5.3, it is seen that the maximum value of the delivery probability
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Figure 5.3: CRL Delivery Probability. vs. Number of Malicious Vehicles
for Spray & Wait is 0.91 which amounts to a value of a 0.02 less than the maximum
value of the delivery probability for DTRvS at 0.93 when no malicious vehicles were
introduced into the network. When 50% of the vehicles became malicious, the minimum
values for the delivery probability for Spray & Wait and DTRvS were 0.12 and 0.22
respectively with DTRvS performing better than Spray & Wait by 0.1. From the trend
in Fig. 5.3 it is expected that an increase in the malicious tendency above 50% will
result in further degradation in the delivery probability.
CRL Delivery Probability vs. Number of Deployed RSUs with DTRvS
The objective in this experiment was to ascertain the impact of using RSUs as relay
stations to deliver CRL messages using the proposed scheme. Note that the proposed
scheme assumed a disconnected network where the infrastructure cannot support end-
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Figure 5.4: Delivered CRL Messages vs. Number of RSUs
to-end communication as in VDTNs. It is also assumed that 50 % of the vehicles in this
experiment exhibit malicious tendencies. Hence, the malicious vehicle was isolated and
CRLs messages sent to the rest of the 50 % healthy vehicles using the Spray & Wait
routing protocol since it provides redundant packet delivery in the network to ensure a
best-eﬀort delivery. In the experiment, 3 to 18 RSUs was deployed with increments of
three (i.e. 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18). The results of the experiment are shown in Fig. 5.4. As
expected, it is observe that the chances of CRL delivery is increasingly improved with
the increase in the number of RSUs. However, there is a 5% improvement when DTRvS
is compared to the use of the native Spray & Wait routing. Another factor is shown in
Fig. 5.3 is in line with the IETF proposal and supported by [123, 124] where multiple
copies of the CRL are circulated within the network as against single-copy routing. It is
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expected that multiple copies will result in more vehicles receiving a copy of the CRL,
hence higher delivery probability for more copies propagated as well as a higher number
of messages delivered.
5.4.3 Eﬃciency and Robustness Analysis
Table 5.1 below is a comparison of the proposed scheme and other revocation schemes
proposed in the literature for robustness and eﬃciency. The comparison is based on the
mode of key distribution, format and the number of messages exchanged, the commu-
nication overhead, the attacker model and trust establishment scheme.
Both the schemes in [125] and [1] employs a centralised infrastructure for the of adminis-
tration of revocation duties. In [126], the revocation scheme is distributed but relies on
a KGC for the bootstrapping and initialisation of the network. Similar to the schemes
in [126], the proposed scheme is both distributed and decentralised. However, due to
the disconnected nature of the network and its inherent lack of infrastructure at the
early stages of deployment, it relies on the RSUs to eﬃciently distribute the revocation
messages.
The number of messages needed or exchanged during the revocation process is critical
to the eﬃciency of the revocation system. Too many messages leads to high signalling
overhead. Whereas other schemes such as [125] and [1] incur the least number of mes-
sages and therefore less signalling overhead, the proposed scheme drastically reduces
this. The overhead incurred include message exchanged in order to establish misbe-
haviour and perform revocation; especially, only one instance of revocation message is
sent per session. In order to ensure its eﬀectiveness, the base routing protocol, Spray &
Wait ensures redundancy by sending several copies of the same message at a time using
the same infrastructure.
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The proposed scheme is based on the distribution of CRLs in a similar manner to other
compared schemes in Table 5.1. However, the misbehaviour detection established helps
to identify well-behaved vehicles and directly send messages to the vehicles instructing
them to reject messages from malicious vehicles afterwards. This way, eﬃcient man-
agement of bandwidth is achieved while drastically reducing the overhead and delay
compared to other schemes.
It is to be highlighted that most of the compared schemes are not clear on the means of
identifying misbehaving vehicles and are based on assumptions. Among the compared
schemes, closest to the proposed scheme is [126] since it uses a trust-based misbehaviour
detection scheme where vehicles derive opinions of each other during an exchange of
messages. The opinion reports are then veriﬁed by the CA before revocation is initiated.
This feature is not present in the scheme proposed in [113] which leaves the system
open to abuse by malicious vehicles due to the absence of a central authority. A major
shortcoming of using a CA for key revocation is scalability because CRLs can grow very
large in size for large domains and networks even with compression.
Although misbehaviour should be detected early enough, the cost and logistics involved
in spreading the revocation information to avoid further damage are critical factors to
consider in the design of revocation systems. It is necessary to understand the economics
of its implementation with regard to infrastructural needs, especially in challenged net-
works. The strength of the proposed scheme is in its delay tolerance to withstand
the lack of end-to-end connectivity in the network. However, the proposed scheme is
expected to perform even better in a network with full infrastructure support. Since
the RSUs are involved in the misbehaviour detection phase, it intelligently selects well-
behaved vehicles to send revocation messages to. That way, the proposed scheme is
able to achieve revocation without relying on the CA as in other schemes.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Revocation Schemes
Scheme Raya et al.[125] Lin et al.[1] Djamaludin[113] Hoeper[126] DTRvS
Key distribution CA CA LFC IBC RSUs
Infrastructure Central Central Distr Distr Distr
Message format CRL MCRL MCRL MCRL MCRL
Adversary model Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong
No. of messages N N O(edges) O(edges) N
Revocation type Vehicle+key Vehicle+key Key only Vehicle Vehicle
Delay tolerance No No Yes No Yes
Trust-based No No No No Yes
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, the consequences of vehicle misbehaviour in VANETs and the need for a
revocation solution that is eﬀective in delay tolerant conditions are highlighted. It also
described the challenges in detecting misbehaviour in intermittently connected network
environments such as DTNs and VDTNs which are the closest characterisations of the
early stages of ITS installation and rural area deployments. The chapter described trust-
based schemes as a means of detecting misbehaviour. The proposed scheme introduces a
delay-tolerant revocation scheme aimed at evicting malicious vehicles. The eﬀectiveness
of the scheme is demonstrated through simulations and owes its eﬀectiveness to the
introduced incentive scheme that encourages vehicles to report misbehaviour. Finally,
the robustness of the proposed scheme is analysed and compared to existing schemes.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
The thesis has addressed the questions raised in chapter one. In this chapter, the
thesis provides conclusions and point directions for future work. A summary of the
motivation for the thesis is presented together with the achievements made in Chapters
3 to 5 (see Fig. 6.1) in line with the set objectives which include how the thesis can
be improved upon and extended in the future. The suggested future work is inspired
by an objective assessment of the proposed schemes in terms of their limitations and
weaknesses. Although the proposed schemes focused on rural areas scenarios, it is
important to stress that their eﬃcacy can be aﬀected in very low vehicle densities due
to the fact that vehicles will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd pseudonym change partners.
The thesis has assumed that honest vehicles and RSUs are expected to follow normal
protocol procedures. However, the eﬃcacy and eﬀectiveness of the proposed schemes can
be further degraded when some vehicles become uncooperative in low-density scenarios.
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Figure 6.1: Summary of Contributions and Achievements
6.1 Conclusion
The exchange of location data between vehicles and the infrastructure in VANETs is
beneﬁcial in a variety of applications such as road safety and traﬃc management. De-
spite these beneﬁts, the exchange of location leads to some security and privacy threats.
The information between vehicles can be used in tracking or following the driver. Of
course, due to the close-knit relationship between a vehicle and its driver, following a
vehicle is as good as following its driver which leads to location privacy concerns. The
use of pseudonyms has been proposed as a way of making it diﬃcult for the privacy
attacker to link vehicles to their real identities. Pseudonyms are alternative identities
with which vehicles can sign messages instead of with their real identities. To ensure a
more eﬀective use of pseudonyms, other extensions to the technique have been proposed
such as the use of frequently changing pseudonyms, mix-zone, silent periods, and group
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communication. However, the eﬀectiveness of most of these schemes depends on the
density of vehicles and the willingness of vehicles to cooperate and change pseudonyms,
especially for mix-zone techniques. Additionally, in a disconnected network similar to
VDTNs especially at the early stages of deployment of ITS, most of the above schemes
fail to be eﬀective. In addition to location privacy attacks, other threats exist including
malicious behaviour such as packet dropping attacks. The disconnected nature of DTN-
like VANETs makes such behaviour diﬃcult to detect. To address these challenges, the
following contributions are made in Chapter 3 to 5 as summarised below.
Contribution 1
In Chapter 3, the thesis assessed and analysed some location privacy schemes based on
the group communication, MOP, Silent Period, k-anonymity and mix-zone techniques.
Based on the analysis above, a novel PET is proposed based on the Jaccard Similarity
Index and group communication.
Contribution 2
In Chapter 4, the weakness and ineﬃciency of ﬁxed mix-zones in guaranteeing location
privacy in a sparse disconnected VANETs is explored. It points out how selﬁsh vehicles
further impact on the ability of benign vehicles to ﬁnd pseudonym change collaborators
by refusing to change pseudonym in a bid to conserve network resources such as energy
and bandwidth. The contributions in this chapter includes the PriSerV scheme which
is a dynamic pseudonym change scheme based on dynamic mix-zones. The strength of
PriSerV is in the ﬂexibility it aﬀords a vehicle to negotiate mix-zones on the ﬂy without
the intervention of infrastructures such as RSUs or the TKMs. This way, the back-and-
forth communication involving vehicles and RSUs which adds a lot of overhead especially
in DTN-like networks is avoided. Note that ﬁxed mix-zone locations are usually well
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known and predictable. Therefore, the adversary can predict the time, location and the
duration of the pseudonym change. The proposed PriSerV scheme confuses the attacker
since the time and location of the mix-zones formed are much less predictable compared
to that of ﬁxed conventional mix-zones. The scheme is also practical enough even for
more advanced scenarios with minor adjustments. The scheme owes its eﬀectiveness to
the introduced incentive scheme that encourages vehicles to report misbehaviour; the
OFMS scheme shows an 8% increase in the pseudonym change for a vehicle density
of 250 vehicles. In the second simulation, by varying the vehicle density from 50 to
250, we recorded about 6 to 10% increase in the pseudonym change compared to the
basic scheme. When compared to the baseline scheme, the proposed OFMS-x show a
50% increase in the message delivery probability and has a considerable decrease in the
delivery overhead even with the increase in the number of vehicles in the network.
The chapter also discusses the use of the group communication scheme which achieves
privacy based on a community of interests by vehicles; such vehicles share common
credentials. The eﬀectiveness of the proposed scheme is validated through simulations
studies which consider the attacker strength, vehicle density and the anonymity dura-
tion. The results show that even for the strongest privacy attacker of 0.95, the proposed
group communication scheme still performs eﬃciently well even under vehicle densities
as low as 10 to 20 vehicles.
Finally, it demonstrates a novel PET based on the Jaccard Similarity Index. Extensive
simulations studies show that the JSI model helps vehicles even better privacy compared
to AVATAR and Mix-zones schemes measured by entropy.
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Contribution 3
Chapter 5 highlighted the challenge of vehicle revocation in disconnected VANETs. The
proposed solution is preceded by a misbehaviour detection scheme based on trust and
opinion aggregation from vehicle encounters. It proposed an eﬃcient revocation scheme
which employed RSUs for sending revocation messages in an eﬃcient manner. In the
scheme, a vehicle's opinion about the behaviour of another is used to decide on the
revocation of privileges. The trust-based scheme identiﬁes a vehicle's malicious activity
using a pre-deﬁned metric namely message delivery and message drop probability. The
ﬁndings from the trust-based misbehaviour detection scheme are used to implement the
proposed delay-tolerant revocation scheme (DTRvS). A discussion about the attitude of
malicious vehicles towards misbehaviour reporting and CRL distribution is performed.
A security and eﬃciency analysis of our scheme in terms of robustness compared to pre-
vious schemes is provided. The feasibility of the proposed DTRvS is demonstrated by
varying the percentage of vehicles from 0 to 50% and measured the delivery probability.
The delivery probability improved by approximately 2 to 11% with DTRvS correspond-
ing to 0 to 50% maliciousness in the network. It was also observed that the chances of
CRL delivery are increased with the increase in the number of RSUs. However, about
5% improvement was recorded when DTRvS cpompared to the use of the native Spray
& Wait for routing protocol.
6.2 Future Work
This thesis has focused on four key achievements that address the challenges of secu-
rity and location privacy in disconnected VANETs. These key areas are by no means
exhaustive especially considering the rapidity at which new advances are being made in
this ﬁeld. Hence the achievements made in this thesis can be extended in a variety of
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ways.
• An experimental privacy analysis using mix-zones as well as proposed a group com-
munication scheme for location privacy was performed. The scheme can be further
analysed for the impact of other security issues such as dishonest group members
joining the group and manipulating received or in-transit packets. Speciﬁcally,
it can also be studied further to device an eﬀective detection and expulsion of
malicious vehicles who are already members of the group.
• In the proposed revocation scheme, the vulnerability window is critical to how
much damage is done before misbehaviour detection and broadcast of revocation
messages. This can be studied further for a more eﬃcient revocation scheme
with respect to the frequency and mode of CRL dissemination. The vulnerability
window can be further investigated for impact assessment. For example, designing
and varying the vulnerability window to assess its impact on the network.
• The thesis discussed misbehaviour detection where it only focused on one type of
misbehaviour - message dropping attacks. It is possible for a vehicle to exhibit
various forms of misbehaviour at the same time. Therefore, the scheme can be
further investigated for a more inclusive variety of attacks.
• The overall framework can be analysed for more varieties of threats in terms
of privacy and security. Speciﬁcally, group formation and dynamic mix-zones
schemes can be further merged for a more robust security and location privacy
scheme and analysed for threats. Lastly, the framework can be evaluated with
respect to cost analysis with a focus on real-world deployment and the cost of
negotiating and changing pseudonyms.
Appendix A
The Opportunistic Network
Environment (ONE) Simulator
The Opportunistic Network Environment (ONE) simulator was originally designed for
the simulation and evaluation of DTN-based network architectures and routing proto-
cols. Speciﬁcally, it's key strengths include modelling of mobility models, message rout-
ing and handling, as well as simulation visualisation, report generation and analysis.
Although the ONE simulator was originally designed for delay tolerant and terrestrial
networks, recent improvements and robust mobility models has made it a good choice
for simulations in vehicular network environments especially in delay tolerant, sparse
and infrastructureless VANETs [28, 127, 128, 129].
The ONE is an event-based simulator. Events can be generated using an inbuilt ran-
dom algorithm as well via an external event generator where popular mobility traces
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Figure A.1: Graphical User Interface of the ONE simulator
can be used as event generators. The CRAWDAD project1 houses a repository of real
world traces such as the INFOCOM, Haggle, MIT, DieselNet2. Messages can be routed
through unicast (one-to-one) or broadcast (one-to-many) schemes using any of the in-
built routing protocols (see Section A.1).
Simulations can be run in two modes namely the GUI and Batch modes. The GUI is
ideal for visualising the movement of nodes and vehicles as shown in Fig. A.1. Any
number of vehicle can be simulated as groups or individuals. However, the eﬃciency and
speed of simulation depends mostly on the speciﬁc settings. As a platform for protocol
1http://crawdad.cs.dartmouth.edu/
2The DieselNet traces are available at http://traces.cs.umass.edu.
140
evaluation, its performance primarily depends on the evaluated protocols and their
computational and memory requirements. Naturally, performance depends on the size
of the simulation area, the number of nodes, their communication range, the mobility
model, and the scanning intervals which together govern the frequency of connection
events [29]. According to [29], simulations usually run much faster than real-time, but
complex simulation set-ups may cause signiﬁcant reduction in simulation speed.
The simulator continuously reports the ratio of simulation time per second of real-time
elapsed, which gives some performance indication. For the simulations presented in [29],
the authors used three rack-mounted Linux PCs with multi-core Intel x86 CPUs 2.9-3.7
GHz and 8-128GB of RAM. However, most simulations can also run eﬃciently well
on less powerful PCs. For large scenarios, the authors observed that mean simulation
speeds range from ratios of 40:1 to excesses of 1000:1 and is dependent on the machine
used, the mobility model, and the routing protocols used. In the simulations, only
MaxProp was noticeably slower (as low as 10:1 and less). The mobility models aﬀects
the frequency of node encounters and inﬂuence the simulation speed indirectly. Ran-
dom Waypoint (RWP) mobility model runs faster than Working Day Mobility (WDM).
Both RWP and WDM are faster than Helsinki City Scenario (HCS). In terms of re-
source usage, the HCS and WDM require more computations compared to RWP when
the scanning interval is increased to 60s. The scanning interval aﬀects the encounter
frequency; 60s scanning interval reduced the simulation time by up to one fourth in
HCS and WDM. Increase in the communication range also leads to more encounters.
This means that more events are generated and hence more processor resource needed
for processing thereby slowing down the simulations.
Some routing protocol are more resource intensive than others. The routing protocols
also inﬂuence performance by the number of message copies they create and thus First
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Contact(FC), Direct Delivery(DD), and Spray and Wait (SW) run faster than Epidemic
and PRoPHET. The more sophisticated MaxProp requires a lot of state information
per node and connection. Therefore, it performs more complex processing and slow
down simulations when simulating a large number of nodes and frequent encounters.
The simulation can also depend on the simulation time resolution. The resolution time
is the interval at which the simulation time is advanced. Doubling the interval makes
the simulations run faster.
Simulations can also be run in Batch mode, for example, from the Microsoft Disk Oper-
ating System(MS-DOS) MS-DOS and Linux terminals as these allow several instances
of simulations to run in parallel. The batch mode is best suited for running simulations
where large scale simulation of vehicles is needed with diﬀerent sets of parameters for
each instance of simulation run. Although both modes generate the same data for anal-
ysis, the batch mode is ideal for situations where real time simulation visualisation is
not important and allows for eﬃcient use of computing resources for the simulation.
In addition to inbuilt mobility models, it is possible to deﬁne custom models as needed.
Speciﬁcally, it supports movement models including pedestrian, train, tram, and buses
using pre-deﬁned models such Random Way-point, Map-based Mobility, and Shortest
Path Map-based mobility models among others. The Map-based and Shortest path
map-based mobility models emulates the movement of vehicles on roads. Hence, they
are mostly used in simulations that require VANETs where the movement of vehicles is
predicable.
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A.1 Routing in The ONE
A variety of routing protocols are available for diﬀerent simulation scenarios, each with
its merits and drawbacks such as the amount of overhead incurred, end-to-end delay
and the delivery probability of messages. Each protocol can be tweaked in several ways
based on need. One common feature of the routing protocols is the ability to route
packets in a delay tolerant manner. We brieﬂy discuss the main simulation protocols
below together with a performance comparison as shown in Figs. A.2 - A.4.
A.1.1 Epidemic Routing Protocol
The Epidemic routing protocol [130] is the ﬁrst routing protocol proposed for delay tol-
erant network environments. Messages generated by Epidemic-enabled routers (nodes)
are assigned unique identities (IDs) including all its copies in circulation. When two
nodes come in contact(i.e. within the transmission range of each other), they exchange
messages not currently held in their buﬀers in the form of a summary vector. The
summary vector can be described as a First-Come First-Served (FCFS) ordered list of
all the message IDs in a node's buﬀer. Depending on the length of the contact duration,
each node may end up having all the messages not currently being held in its buﬀer,
thereby guaranteeing 100% delivery probability of all messages. Again, Epidemic incurs
a low end-to-end delivery delay since multiple paths are used to route messages. How-
ever, EPIDEMIC is characterised by ineﬃcient resource consumption such as memory,
energy, and contact duration.
A.1.2 Spray and Wait Routing Protocol
In order to save on the resource consumption of the Epidemic protocol, the Spray and
Wait protocol is proposed in [131]. The motivation behind Spray and Wait is, by
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limiting the number of message copies allowed in the network, network resources can be
more eﬃciently utilised. Each copy of a message routing for a destination is assigned a
unique number that references the other copies in the network. The number is increased
each time the copy is routed at each node until there is only one copy left in circulation
at which stage the generating node stops further copies until the packet reaches its
destination or is dropped due to inadequate memory space. A binary version of the
SnW protocol is proposed in [131] in which only half the number of copies is allowed
in the network for the nodes and the other half for the recipient nodes. The drawback
of both versions of SnW is the lack of intelligent path selection of the next hop node
which is attributed to poor message delivery ratio. However, SnW generally performs
better than Epidemic.
A.1.3 ProPHET Routing Protocol
The routing principles of ProPHET [132] is based on how a node estimates a metric
called delivery predictability, P(a,b), at each node a for each destination b. When a
and b meet, their delivery predictability toward each other is updated. After this, the
two nodes exchange their delivery predictability list toward other nodes update their
delivery predictability toward each other.
The intelligence of PROPHET lies in its ability to regulate routing towards the des-
tination by using the knowledge of the contact history between nodes and assigning
weights to these contacts whether directly or through intermediate nodes. Due to this,
it performs better than blind protocols in terms of delivery ratio. However, the packet
delay may increase due to the complex algorithm and waiting time spend in waiting for
a good next node in the path.
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A.1.4 MAXPROP Routing Protocol
The MAXPROP protocol proposed in [133] is similar to ProPHET in that estimates
a node metric, P(a, b), similar to PROPHET. When two nodes a and b meet, they
strengthen the link between each other by adding a constant α which is set to equal 1
in the protocol. The two nodes divide their delivery predictability towards all the nodes
including each other by 1 + α so that the sum of all delivery predictability remains
1. The node metric is used only when the hop count of the packet is greater than a
certain threshold. The main contribution of MAXPROP is in its buﬀer management.
Packets are sorted according to their hop count if the hop count is below a certain
threshold. Otherwise, packets are sorted with their delivery predictability. In this way,
MAXPROP favours packets with lower hop count to spread in the network.
A.1.5 Direct Delivery and First Contact
Direct-Delivery and First-Contact are both single copy routing protocols, namely only
one copy of each message exists in the network. In Direct-Delivery, messages are only
delivered to their ﬁnal destination. First-Contact always forwards the messages to the
ﬁrst contact and then deletes them from the queue; this means that messages can be
handled by several nodes. Both protocols employ FIFO queuing.
A.2 The ONE Simulator in VANET/ITS Environments
As we earlier pointed out, the ONE was originally published with routing in DTN-based
architectures in mind. However, it has been popular in VANETs/ITS applications due
to its ability to model several aspects of classical VANETs with minor modiﬁcations
while retaining the delay tolerant ability of routing in DTNs. Speciﬁcally, physical later
attributes of most VANET-speciﬁc standards (including the IEEE 802.11p) such as
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bandwidth, transmission range, and packet size can be implemented by tweaking either
the setting ﬁle or the source code of the ONE simulator can be tweaked to emulate. One
of the pioneering papers based on the use of the ONE simulator in the area of VANET
simulation include the work in [28].
However, it is not possible to incorporate channel speciﬁc attributes such channel fading,
hence it cannot work with simulation problems involving the hidden node problems of
antennas.
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Figure A.2: Message delivery probability
Figure A.3: Message delivery overhead
Figure A.4: Message delivery latency
Appendix B
Further Discussion on Revocation
Schemes
B.1 Classiﬁcation of Revocation Schemes
Revocation schemes can be classiﬁed into two major types viz : centralized schemes
based on a PKI foundation, and decentralized schemes based on community collabora-
tion. Both schemes have one feature in common, a reputation or trust-based system
for detecting malicious vehicles. In both schemes, authorized entities should be able to
generate and distribute CRLs to inform innocent vehicles against communication with
malicious vehicles early enough to reduce the vulnerability window.
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B.1.1 Centralized Revocation Schemes
Centralized revocation list distribution for VANETs based on the PKI architecture re-
lies on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) in the form of a TKM to manage certiﬁcates as
well as distribute CRLs [134, 135, 69, 1, 126]. The TTP or TKM makes the decision
on what vehicle is revoked and the CRLs distributed directly or indirectly to the in-
tended recipients. Direct delivery methods often make use of RSUs as the intermediate
infrastructure for faster delivery. In [135, 69], Raya et al. proposed an architecture and
mechanism for key revocation based on the use of CAs for distributing CRLs. Two key
factors aﬀect the revocation process: the delay incurred to distribute CRLs and the size
of CRL messages. CRLs must be distributed in a manner that guarantees fast prop-
agation and decryption by recipient vehicles. The Compressed Certiﬁcate Revocation
Lists RC2RL seeks to address the issue of oversized CRLs for large scale networks [135].
Raya et al. [135] also proposed the Distributed Revocation Protocol (DRP) where ve-
hicles temporarily revoke each other's certiﬁcates before the CA intervenes to remove
the misbehaving vehicle from the network. Raya et al. [69] also proposed the eviction
of malicious vehicles using Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Emulators (LEAVE),
Revocation of the Trusted Component (RTC), revocation using Compressed Certiﬁcate
Revocation Lists (RC2RL), and a Misbehaviour Detection System (MDS) to safeguard
the system operation, until the attacker is revoked by the CA, either partially or fully
based on the LEAVE protocol. Revocation can also be done through the On-board
Unit of a vehicle, with instruction to revoke itself [126]. In this case, when the CA
wants to revoke a misbehaving vehicle, it sends revocation information to the target ve-
hicles whose certiﬁcate need to be revoked. Over dependence on the CA for revocation
administration can constitute a major problem to security as CAs are single points of
failure especially in IC-VANETs. The scheme by [1] makes use of existing RSUs and the
mobility pattern of vehicles to execute revocation of malicious vehicles. The eﬃciency
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of this scheme is based on the fact that uninterrupted connection between the RSUs
and CAs can be easily used to query and obtain revocation information.
B.1.2 Decentralized Revocation Schemes
The decentralized scheme for certiﬁcation revocation ﬁnds application in ad hoc net-
works such as VDNTs with no central authority unlike CA-based PKI methods. The
advantage of decentralized schemes is that they are more economical from a practical
point of view since they don't require deployment of costly infrastructure mainly be-
cause key management and CRL distribution functions are shared amongst multiple
entities. In comparison to centralized schemes, they avoid the single-point of failure
problem associated with stand-alone systems by using a distributed system for revoca-
tion. In [113], the authors propose a revocation based on opinion poll. In the scheme,
during each encounter between two vehicles, a vehicle is rated based on its behaviour.
The rating can be based on a variety of metrics such as its data forwarding ability or
its ability to announce accurate events [104]. In such schemes, a vehicle is considered a
revocation candidate if at the end of the evaluation period, its reputation or rating falls
below a set healthy threshold [115, 114] as reported by observing vehicle and conﬁrmed.
It is highlighted that the proposed scheme can use either a centralized or decentralized
revocation technique together with a trust module for malicious vehicle detection.
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